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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 1990, hip-hop artist Vanilla Ice released his song “Ice Ice Baby” 
in the United States and it quickly became a hit, giving hip-hop its first 
number one song atop the Billboard “Hot 100” chart.1 Before long, 
however, the song stirred up a controversy rivaling its popularity due to 
Vanilla Ice’s “sampling” of the bass line from Queen and David Bowie’s 
1981 hit “Under Pressure.”2 Vanilla Ice did not acquire a license or 
permission from the “Under Pressure” artists and did not give them any 
songwriting credits as required under copyright law.3 Shortly after the 
                                                 
1
 Billboard Charts Archive, the Top 100 – 1990, BILLBOARD, 
http://www.billboard.com/archive/charts/1990/hot-100 (last visited Sept. 24, 2016); Steve 
Huey, To The Extreme, ALLMUSIC, http://www.allmusic.com/album/to-the-extreme-
mw0000316695 (last visited Sept. 24, 2016); Joe Lynch, 8 Songs Accused of Plagiarism 
that Hit No. 1 on the Billboard Hot 100, BILLBOARD, 
http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/list/6501950/songs-accused-plagiarism-no-1-hot-
100-blurred-lines (last visited Sept. 24, 2016); Mim Udovitch, To The Extreme, ENT. 
WKLY., http://www.ew.com/article/1990/11/02/extreme (last visited Sept. 24, 
2016);Vanilla Ice’s real name is Rob Van Winkle. Kevin Stillman, ‘Word to Your Mother,’ 
IOWA ST. DAILY, http://www.iowastatedaily.com/news/article_766d27d2-dc56-5ff3-9040-
47e44d46094f.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2016). 
2
 See Eric Arnum, Digital Flashback: Samplers Run Amok, MTV, 
http://www.mtv.com/news/620408/digital-flashback-samplers-run-amok (last visited Sept. 
24, 2016); Famous Copyright Infringement Cases in Music, WEINHAUS & POTASHNICK, 
http://www.fairwagelawyers.com/most-famous-music-copyright-infringment.html (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2016); Peter Relic, The 25 Most Notorious Uncleared Samples in Rap 
History, COMPLEX MAG., http://www.complex.com/music/2013/04/the-25-most-notorious-
uncleared-samples-in-rap-history/vanilla-ice-ice-ice-baby-sampling-david-bowie-and (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2016); Matthew Yglesias, Was Paul’s Boutique Illegal?, SLATE MAG., 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2012/05/adam_yauch_and_paul_s_bouti
que_how_dumb_court_decisions_have_made_it_nearly_impossible_for_artists_to_sample
_the_way_the_beastie_boys_did.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2016). 
3
 See ROGER L. SADLER, ELECTRONIC MEDIA LAW 309 (Sage Publ’ns 2005); Alex 
Holz, How You Can Clear Cover Songs, Samples, and Handle Public Domain Works, AM. 
SOC’Y OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS, 
http://www.ascap.com/playback/2011/01/features/limelight.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 
2016); Rich Stim, When You Need Permission to Sample Others' Music, NOLO, 
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controversy erupted, Vanilla Ice told MTV in a 1990 interview that the bass 
lines from “Ice Ice Baby” and “Under Pressure” were actually different 
because he had added in a single extra beat.4 But within months, Queen and 
Bowie threatened to sue the young rapper for copyright infringement,5 and 
the matter eventually settled out-of-court.6 The “Ice Ice Baby” incident was 
one of the first major music sampling controversies, but over the next 
fifteen years, dozens of musicians faced similar lawsuits or threats of suit 
for copyright infringement.7
  
 
                                                                                                                            
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/permission-sampled-music-sample-clearance-
30165.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2016). 
4
 Luke Davis, Throwback Thursday: Vanilla Ice Denying he Ripped Off “Under 
Pressure,” SAMPLEFACE, http://www.sampleface.co.uk/vanilla-ice-denying-he-ripped-off-
under-pressure/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2016). (Van Winkle later said in an interview with a 
reporter from the Iowa State Daily that he was joking during the 1990 interview with MTV 
when he tried to distinguish the bass line of “Ice Ice Baby” from “Under Pressure.” 
Whether or not he was actually joking in the 1990 interview is debatable.) 
5
 SADLER, supra note 3, at 309; Famous Copyright Infringement Cases in Music, 
WEINHAUS & POTASHNICK, http://www.fairwagelawyers.com/most-famous-music-
copyright-infringment.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2016); Jordan Runtagh, Songs on Trial: 
10 Landmark Music Copyright Cases, ROLLING STONE, 
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/lists/songs-on-trial-10-landmark-music-copyright-
cases-20160608/vanilla-ice-vs-queen-and-david-bowie-1990-20160608 (last visited Sept. 
24, 2016). 
6
 SADLER, supra note 3, at 309; Famous Copyright Infringement Cases in Music, 
WEINHAUS & POTASHNICK, supra note 5; Runtagh, supra note 5. (According to Van 
Winkle in an interview with an Iowa newspaper, the artist allegedly settled the case for $4 
million. Stillman, supra note 1.) 
7
 Justin Charity, 9 Legal Battles Between Rappers and the Artists They Sampled, 
COMPLEX MAG., http://www.complex.com/music/2014/09/how-many-emcees-must-get-
sued/gold-digger (last vistied Nov. 5, 2016). (There have been several prominent cases in 
the last two decades where popular musicians and groups have been sued regarding 
unauthorized music sampling, including Jay Z for his hit “Big Pimpin,” Kayne West for 
“Gold Digger,” and most recently, Justin Bieber and the DJ Skrillex, who were sued in 
2016 for alleged sampling in their hit song “Sorry.”) See Steward v. West, No. 13-02449, 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186012, *25–27 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2014); Daniel Kreps, Justin 
Bieber, Skrillex Sued Over ‘Sorry’ Hook, ROLLING STONE, 
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/justin-bieber-skrillex-sued-over-sorry-hook-
20160527 (last visited Sept. 24, 2016); Ben Sisario, Jay Z and Timbaland Win Copyright 
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 In 2005, the standard for copyright infringement in music sampling 
cases appeared to shift to a strict, bright line rule when the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals rejected the use of a “substantial similarity” test in the 
landmark decision Bridgeport Music Inc. v. Dimension Films and held that 
any unauthorized sampling of a sound recording was grounds for copyright 
infringement.8 The decision cut against long-standing principles of 
copyright law which dictated that in infringement cases courts must perform 
a substantial similarity analysis, and by natural extension must consider the 
defense of de minimis non curat lex, or simply de minimis.9 
                                                                                                                            
Lawsuit Over ‘Big Pimpin’ Sample, THE NEW YORK TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/22/business/media/jay-z-and-timbaland-win-copyright-
lawsuit-over-big-pimpin-sample.html?_r=0 (last visited Sept. 24, 2016). (Another 
notorious example that happened around the same time as “Ice Ice Baby” was MC 
Hammer’s “You Can’t Touch This,” which sampled the base line from Rick James’ song 
“Superfreak”; that case also settled out-of-court when Hammer (real name Stanley Burrell) 
agreed to give James a songwriting credit (which would also entitle him to royalties).) See 
Kenneth Partridge, ‘U Can’t Touch This’ at 25: Remembering MC Hammer’s 
Breakthrough Single, BILLBOARD, http://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/the-
juice/6436624/u-cant-touch-this-25-anniversary-mc-hammer (last visited Sept. 24, 2016); 
Randy Reiss, Rick James Undergoes Physical Rehab, MTV, 
http://www.mtv.com/news/503519/rick-james-undergoes-physical-rehab/ (last visited Sept. 
24, 2016); Pat Pemberton, U Can’t Touch This, ROLLING STONE, 
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/u-can-t-touch-this-mc-hammer (last visited Sept. 
24, 2016). 
8
 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801–05 (6th Cir. 
2005) (finding the de minimis defense did not apply to sound recordings under federal 
copyright law and any unauthorized copying of sampled music, no matter how small or 
insignificant, could constitute copyright infringement.) 
9
 Mike Suppappola, Confusion in the Digital Age: Why the De Minimis Use Test 
Should be Applied to Digital Samples of Copyrighted Sound Recordings, 14 TEX. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J., 93, 98–99 (2006). (The author notes: 
The principle that trivial copying does not constitute actionable 
infringement has long been a central tenet of copyright law. Indeed, 
Judge Learned Hand observed over 80 years ago that “[s]ome copying is 
permitted. In addition to copying, it must be shown that this has been 
done to an unfair extent.” “This principle reflects the legal maxim, de 
minimis non curatlex . . . .” “De minimis use means that a copying ‘has 
2017] SPLIT CHORDS: ADDRESSING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 135 
 Though the Sixth Circuit’s Bridgeport standard stood unchallenged 
by its sister circuits for more than a decade, critics derided the opinion10 and 
some lower courts outright declined to follow it.11 In June 2016, Madonna’s 
(real name Madonna Louise Ciccone) hit song “Vogue” brought the 
                                                                                                                            
occurred to such a trivial extent as to fall below the quantitative [and 
qualitative] threshold of substantial similarity . . . .’”) 
Id. The term de minimis non curatlex, or de minimis for short, is often translated as, 
“the law does not concern itself with trifles.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); 
See also Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991). (holding that 
the selection, coordination, and arrangement of respondent's white pages constituted a “de 
minimis quantum of creativity” and thus did not satisfy the minimum constitutional 
standards for copyright protection); See Also Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192–95 
(9th Cir. 2004) (finding the Beastie Boys’ use of a six-second, three-note flute segment of 
plaintiff’s musical composition was de minimis and therefore not actionable as a matter of 
law). 
10
 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03 
[A][2][b] (2015); Mark R. Carter, Applying the Fragmented Literal Similarity Test to 
Musical-Work and Sound-Recording Infringement: Correcting the Bridgeport Music, Inc. 
v. Dimension Films Legacy, 14 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 669, 681–84 (2013) (criticizing the 
Bridgeport holding and proposing the use of the Fragmented Literal Similarity Test as the 
standard for sound recording infringement cases); Julie Cromer, Harry Potter and the 
Three-Second Crime: Are We Vanishing the De Minimis Doctrine from Copyright Law?, 
36 N. M. L. REV. 261, 283 (2006) (arguing that the “Sixth Circuit’s blanket disregard for 
substantial similarity or a de minimis test is not only improper but reckless”); Michael Jude 
Galvin, Bright Line at Any Cost: The Sixth Circuit Unjustifiably Weakens the Protection 
for Musical Composition Copyrights in Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 9 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH. L. 529, 539 (2007) (criticizing the Bridgeport holding and asserting that the 
Sixth Circuit “should have affirmed the decision of the district court and dismissed the 
plaintiff’s infringement claim”); John Schietinger, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension 
Films: How the Sixth Circuit Missed a Beat on Digital Music Sampling, 55 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 209, 210 (2005) (criticizing the Bridgeport holding as “problematic and potentially 
harmful”).   
11
 Steward v. West, No. 13-02449, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186012 at *25–27 (C.D. 
Cal. Aug. 14, 2014) (noting that Bridgeport “has been criticized by courts and 
commentators alike” and declining to follow its holding); Batiste v. Najm, 28 F. Supp. 3d 
595, 625 n.52 (E.D. La. 2014) (noting Bridgeport’s holding and declining to follow); 
Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1338–41 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (explicitly 
declining to follow Bridgeport’s holding, finding that Bridgeport’s statutory interpretation 
was flawed and that the Bridgeport court’s “policy prescriptions, however accurate they 
may be, do not present grounds for this Court to follow its direction”); EMI Records Ltd. v. 
Premise Media Corp. L.P., 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 7485 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 8, 2008) 
(explicitly declining to follow the statutory interpretation “relied upon by the court in 
Bridgeport Music to declare the bright line rule that a de minimis exception is not 
available”). 
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Bridgeport opinion back into the public sphere.12 In VMG Salsoul v. 
Ciccione, the Federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed 
whether a 0.23 second piece of audio allegedly sampled from an earlier 
disco song and reused in Madonna’s “Vogue” constituted infringement.13 
The Court’s opinion directly rejected the reasoning of Bridgeport, holding 
that a substantial similarity test must be used, and the de minimis defense 
does apply in music sampling cases.14 This created a circuit split and an 
inconsistent rule of law at the federal appellate level.15  
 This Note addresses the conflict in the Federal Circuit Courts 
regarding the interpretation of copyright law and whether substantial 
similarity, the de minimis defense, and the “fair use” defense should be 
available in music sampling cases. Part I of the note discusses the evolution 
of music sampling and copyright infringement cases which have defined the 
area. Part II addresses the recently created circuit split, analyzes the 
arguments made by each court and discusses the merits, potential 
ramifications and policy implications of each view. Part III will propose 
how the circuit split should be resolved and will provide another method 
                                                 
12
 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016); see Madona’s 
‘Vogue’ Didn’t Infringe Disco Song, 84 U.S.L.W. 1826 (2016).  
13
 VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 874. 
14
 Id. at 880-88.  
15
 Id. at 886; see Madona’s ‘Vogue’ Didn’t Infringe Disco Song, 84 U.S.L.W. 1826 
(2016).  
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courts may use to analyze music sampling cases in order to give effect to 
the legislative interests of copyright law.  
I.   BACKGROUND 
 
 The origins of music sampling date back to the nineteenth century,16 
but the type of sampling discussed in both Bridgeport and VMG Salsoul17 
dates back only to the mid-twentieth century.18 Sampling did not become a 
popular technique in the music industry until the 1980’s, when hip-hop and 
rap musicians began sampling segments of their own and others’ work, like 
drums beats and bass lines, and reusing them in other songs.19 Almost 
immediately, this relatively new technique of music sampling began posing 
legal problems for artists who wanted to use it.20  
                                                 
16
 Hugh Davies, A History of Sampling, 1 J. ORGANISED SOUND 3, 10 (1996). 
17
 See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 874 and Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension 
Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801–05 (6th Cir. 2005) (the type of music sampling discussed in this 
note is narrowly focused on sampling where an artist or producer uses a piece of equipment 
(initially a “sampler” machine, but now more commonly software programs on computers) 
to copy a piece or segment of already-recorded music and insert it, either unedited or after 
it has been modified, into another musical work); see also SADLER, supra note 3, at 309, 
Digital Music Sampling: Creativity or Criminality?, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (Jan. 28, 2011, 
1:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=133306353, Jane 
McGrath, How Music Sampling Works, HOW STUFF WORKS (Sept. 24, 2016), 
http://entertainment.howstuffworks.com/music-sampling1.htm (since about the 1970’s, 
sampling has generally referred to “‘the method by which special musical instruments or 
apparatus digitally ‘record’ external sounds’ for later playback. Playback usually consists 
of either simply pressing a button, or key, to recall a recorded sample or programming a 
music sequencer to trigger a sample automatically within a predetermined arrangement of 
samples”),  Michael Allyn Pote, Mashed-up in Between: The Delicate Balance of Artists' 
Interests Lost amidst the War on Copyright, 88 N.C. L. REV. 639, 643–44 (2010). 
18
 See Davies, supra note 16, at 10. 
19
 Pote, supra note 17, at 645; see also JOSEPH G. SCHLOSS, MUSIC CULTURE: 
MAKING BEATS: THE ART OF SAMPLE-BASED HIP-HOP, 35–40 (Wesleyan Univ. Press 
2014). 
20
 See, e.g., Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182, 
183–85 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that defendants, including rapper Marcel Theo Hall, also 
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 These problems began to arise in part because the innovate new 
technology raised questions as to how copyright law protected these 
sampled pieces of music, and later because of the complex and often 
expensive nature of the licensing process which developed—what has now 
become known in the music industry as “sample clearing,” the process a 
musician uses to obtain a license to sample a portion of another artist’s 
work in their own song.21 The process of “sample clearing” essentially 
amounts to getting authorization from and providing compensation to the 
copyright holder of the original work.22 But because copyrights exist for 
both the underlying musical composition of the song, as well as the actual 
sound recording of the song,23 this usually requires the sampling artist to get 
“clearance” from two, sometimes separate, entities: the copyright owner of 
                                                                                                                            
known as “Biz Markie,” intentionally violated plaintiff’s rights by using three words from 
plaintiff's song and sampling a portion of the plaintiff’s master recording without 
permission on defendant’s album “I Need a Haircut”), Michaelangelo Matos, How 
M/A/R/R/S ‘Pump Up The Volume’ Became Dance Music’s First Pop Hit, ROLLING STONE 
(July 14, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/features/how-m-a-r-r-s-pump-up-the-
volume-became-dance-musics-first-pop-hit-20160714, Relic, supra note 2, Jeremy 
Mersereau, 10 Artists Who Were Sued For Unauthorized Samples, AUX TV (Nov. 10, 
2015), http://www.aux.tv/2015/11/10-artists-who-were-sued-for-unauthorized-samples/. By 
the end of the 1980’s, several hip-hop, rap and dance music artists were already getting into 
legal trouble for unauthorized sampling in their music. See Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. 
Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Mersereau, supra; Relic, supra 
note 2. 
21
 Kembrew McLeod and Peter DiCola, CREATIVE LICENSE: THE LAW AND 
CULTURE OF DIGITAL SAMPLING 77–78 (Duke Univ. Press Books 2011).  
22 
See Holz, supra note 3, Stim, supra note 3; see also Guide to Sample Clearance 
for Producers, COMPLEX MAG. (June 27, 2013), 
http://www.complex.com/music/2013/06/guide-to-sample-clearance-for-producers/. 
23
 See SADLER, supra note 3, at 309, Holz, supra note 3, Stim, supra note 3. 
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the song’s musical composition and the copyright owner of the master tape 
of the sound recording.24  
 The copyright holder will normally ask for either a flat fee, 
songwriting credit with royalties, or some other type of compensation for 
use of the sampled work.25 If a copyrighted piece of recorded music is 
sampled and then used in another work without proper authorization, the 
owner of either copyright may bring an infringement lawsuit against the 
offending party.26 While some sampling artists like the Beastie Boys have 
gotten into trouble for getting only one of the two licenses required for 
sampling,27 others, like Vanilla Ice, did not attempt to get licenses for the 
samples they used at all.28 
                                                 
24
 See Jimmy Ness, The Queen of Sample Clearance: An Interview With Deborah 
Mannis-Gardner, FORBES (Feb. 19, 2016, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/passionoftheweiss/2016/02/19/the-queen-of-sample-clearance-
an-interview-with-deborah-mannis-gardner/#5390b6cc412f, Stim, supra note 3, Guide to 
Sample Clearance for Producers, supra note 22 (thus, there is copyright protection for both 
the underlying musical composition—the notes to be played and their arrangement—and 
the actual recording of the composition when the musicians play the composition and “fix 
it in the medium” by recording it onto a tape or electronically onto a storage device). 
25
 See SADLER, supra note 3, at 309; Holz, supra note 3; Stim, supra note 3. A 
songwriting credit is not just an acknowledgement of credit or thanks, it normally also 
entitles the credited artist to a portion of the fees or “royalties” for the song in the future. 
Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It's Due: The Law and Norms of Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J. 
49, 80 (2006).   
26
 See SADLER, supra note, 3 at 309; Holz, supra note 3; Stim, supra note 3. 
27
 See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1191 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the 
Beastie Boys obtained a sampling license for the sound recording at issue but failed to 
obtain the proper license for the underlying musical composition). 
28
 See Famous Copyright Infringement Cases in Music supra note 2; Relic, supra 
note 3. 
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 The standards for federal copyright law are set out in the Copyright 
Act of 1976.29 Under the body of case law interpreting the federal Copyright 
Act, in order for a plaintiff to prove infringement, she must establish three 
essential elements: (1) ownership of a valid copyright; (2), a copying; (3) 
“of constituent elements of the work that are original.”30 Assuming the 
plaintiff can satisfy the first element by showing ownership, in order for the 
defendant’s use to constitute infringement the plaintiff must also 
demonstrate that her work was copied by the defendant, and under the third 
prong, long-standing copyright principles dictate that the plaintiff must also 
prove that the copied portion was original, and that the defendant copied a 
legally significant portion of it.31 In other words, if defendant Artist A is 
sued for copying the work of plaintiff Artist B, then Artist B must show: 
                                                 
29
 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2016); NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 1-OV. 
30 
Feist 499 U.S. at 363 (1991) (holding that the selection, coordination, and 
arrangement of respondent's white pages did not satisfy the minimum constitutional 
standards for copyright protection); Newton 388 F.3d at 1192–95 (finding the defendant’s 
use of a six-second, three-note flute segment of plaintiff’s musical composition was de 
minimis and did not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright protection 
and therefore not actionable as a matter of law); Leigh v. Warner Bros., 212 F.3d 1210, 
1214 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Even in the rare case of a plaintiff with direct evidence that a 
defendant attempted to appropriate his original expression, there is no infringement unless 
the defendant succeeded to a meaningful degree.”); Sid & Marty Krofft TV Prods. v. 
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (using “total concept and feel” 
variant of substantial similarity test to find defendants had infringed on plaintiff’s 
copyright); NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A]. 
31
 See Newton 388 F.3d at 1192–95 (using the substantial similarity test to determine 
the defendant’s use of a six-second, three-note flute segment of plaintiff’s musical 
composition was de minimis and did not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for 
copyright protection and therefore not actionable as a matter of law);  Leigh, 212 F.3d at 
1215 (finding defendant’s film sequence not substantially similar to plaintiff’s work as a 
matter of law); Sid & Marty Krofft TV Prods., 562 F.2d at 1167 (using “total concept and 
feel” variant of substantial similarity test to find defendants had infringed on plaintiff’s 
copyright); see also NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A]. 
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Artist A copied her work, that her work was original enough to warrant 
copyright protection, and that Artist A has taken and reused a legally 
significant portion of the work.32 Thus, even if the defendant admits she has 
copied the plaintiff’s work, the plaintiff must still show that the work is 
eligible for copyright protection and that the defendant has copied a legally 
significant portion of it.33 
 A core test for determining whether there has been a legally 
significant infringement is the substantial similarity test.34 A long line of 
cases have recognized the concept of substantial similarity as being a basic 
tenant of copyright protection, dating all the way back to the 19
th
 Century.35 
                                                 
32
 NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A].  
33
 Id. See also Galvin, supra note 10 at 531; Schietinger supra note 10 at 218–19.   
34
 See NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A] [1]-[4]; Galvin, supra note 
10 at 531; Schietinger supra note 10 at 218–19. See also Jason E. Sloan, An Overview of 
the Elements of a Copyright Infringement Cause of Action - Part II: Improper 
Appropriation, AM. BAR ASS’N 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_ser
ies/part_2_elements_of_a_copyright.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2016). 
35
 See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). Justice Joseph 
Story explained that while the entire work need not have been appropriated to trigger 
copyright infringement liability, a significant portion must have been copied, writing:  
It is certainly not necessary, to constitute an invasion of copyright, 
that the whole of a work should be copied, or even a large portion of it, in 
form or in substance. If so much is taken, that the value of the original is 
sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially 
to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient, in point 
of law, to constitute a piracy pro tanto. 
Id. (emphasis added). See also Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 676–78 (1878) (“A 
copyright gives the author or the publisher the exclusive right of multiplying copies of what 
he has written or printed. It follows that to infringe this right a substantial copy of the 
whole or of a material part must be produced.”) (emphasis added); Dymow v. Bolton, 11 
F.2d 690, 692(2d Cir. 1926) (“But an examination of that and other cases will show that the 
inquiry actually made was always to ascertain what had been appropriated, if anything, and 
then decide whether the appropriation was (1) of copyrightable matter, and (2) was 
substantial.”) (emphasis added).   
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Ultimately, the substantial similarity test seeks to determine whether there is 
a significant likeness between the alleged infringing work and the original 
copyrighted work, both quantitatively and qualitatively.36 While there are 
different variations of the substantial similarity test,37
 
one of the keys to the 
test used most often by courts is whether the allegedly infringing work is 
recognizable to an average audience member.38 As the Ninth Circuit 
explains: “If the public does not recognize the appropriation, then the copier 
has not benefitted from the original artist's expressive content. Accordingly, 
there is no infringement.”39 
 However, a threshold issue of the “substantial similarity” test is 
whether the infringement is actionable at all: if the portion of the work 
copied is legally insignificant, it will not sustain a cause of action for 
                                                 
36
 See NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A]. As professor David Nimmer 
points out, there is a subtle, yet critical distinction between what is normally termed 
“probative similarity,” a factual offer that a work has been copied (i.e. did the defendant 
literally take portions of the original copyrighted work), and “substantial similarity,” which 
seeks to determine if the alleged infringement has copied a legally “significant” portion of 
the work. Id. Despite its obvious-sounding name, it is important to note the subtly and 
complexity of the various versions of the substantial similarity test, of which Nimmer 
writes, “The determination of the extent of similarity that will constitute a substantial, and 
hence infringing, similarity presents one of the most difficult questions in copyright law.” 
Id. 
37
 See NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A] [1]-[4]. See also Carter 
supra note 10 at 677; Sloan, supra note 34. 
38
 See NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [E][1], § 13.03 [A]. This is the 
so-called “audience test.” NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [E][1]. Looking at 
this version of the substantial similarity test, the comparison is not made simply in terms of 
literal similarity between the two works, but also whether the alleged infringing work is so 
similar that an average listener might recognize it, or mistake it for the original copyrighted 
work.
 
NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A], § 13.03 [E][1]. See also Carter 
supra note 10 at 677.  
39
 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 881 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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infringement.40 Courts normally apply the concept of de minimis to 
determine if the alleged infringement is actionable as a matter of law.41 If 
the legal standard of substantial similarity is not met, then the court may 
dismiss the case as de minimis, usually on a motion to dismiss, summary 
judgment or judgment as a matter of law, before it reaches a jury.42 As an 
example, one test applied by the Ninth Circuit in Fisher v. Dees holds that 
the use of a piece of music or other work is considered de minimis, or not 
“substantial” enough to be actionable, “only if it is so meager and 
                                                 
40
 See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192–93 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissing 
plaintiff’s case on summary judgment because the defendant’s use of a six-second, three-
note flute segment of plaintiff’s musical composition was de minimis and did not satisfy the 
minimum constitutional standards for copyright protection); Ringgold v. Black 
Entertainment TV, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that “de minimis can mean 
that copying has occurred to such a trivial extent as to fall below the quantitative threshold 
of substantial similarity, which is always a required element of actionable copying”); 
NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][a].  
41
 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991) (holding 
that the selection, coordination, and arrangement of respondent's white pages did not 
satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright protection); Newton, 388 F.3d at 
1192–95 (holding that the defendant’s use of a six-second, three-note flute segment of 
plaintiff’s musical composition was de minimis and did not satisfy the minimum 
constitutional standards for copyright protection and therefore not actionable as a matter of 
law); Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1337–1338 (S.D. Fla. 2009) 
(finding that the defendant’s alleged use of a two-second piece of plaintiff’s work was not 
substantially similar and granting summary judgment to the defendant on that issue); 
NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03[A]. 
42
 See, e.g., Lil' Joe Wein Music, Inc. v. Jackson, 245 Fed. Appx. 873, 880 (11th Cir. 
2007) (dismissing plaintiff’s case on summary judgment in part because the alleged 
infringement was de minimis and “[n]o reasonable jury, properly instructed, could conclude 
that Lil' Joe Wein's and the Defendants' compositions are substantially similar”); Newton, 
388 F.3d at 1192–95 (dismissing plaintiff’s case on summary judgment because the 
defendant’s use of a six-second, three-note flute segment of plaintiff’s musical composition 
was de minimis and did not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright 
protection); Steward, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186012, *25–27 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2014) 
(ruling in favor of defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because defendant’s 
alleged infringement was de minimis); Saregama India Ltd., 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1338–41 
(finding that the defendant’s alleged use of a two-second piece of plaintiff’s work lacked 
substantial similarity, was de minimis, and granting summary judgment to the defendant on 
that issue). 
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fragmentary that the average audience would not recognize the 
appropriation.”43 Thus, the concept of de minimis has historically been used 
as a defense by alleged infringers to argue that their copying is not legally 
significant enough to be actionable.44 
 In addition to the principle of de minimis, another potential defense 
available to a musician being sued for copyright infringement is the doctrine 
of “fair use.”45 Fair use is an affirmative defense which can only be used 
once substantial similarity between the original and alleged infringing work 
has been established.46 Thus, fair use can be an alternative or fallback 
                                                 
43
 Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). 
44
 See, e.g., Lil' Joe Wein Music, 245 Fed. Appx. at 880 (dismissing plaintiff’s case 
on summary judgment in part because the alleged infringement was de minimis and “[n]o 
reasonable jury, properly instructed, could conclude that Lil' Joe Wein's and the 
Defendants' compositions are substantially similar”); Newton, 388 F.3d at 1192–95 
(dismissing plaintiff’s case on summary judgment because the defendant’s use of a six-
second, three-note flute segment of plaintiff’s musical composition was de minimis and did 
not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright protection); Steward, 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186012 at *25–27 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2014) (ruling in favor of 
defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because defendant’s alleged 
infringement was de minimis); Saregama India Ltd., 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1338–41 (finding 
that the defendant’s alleged use of a two-second piece of plaintiff’s work lacked substantial 
similarity, was de minimis, and granting summary judgment to the defendant on that issue). 
45
 See NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10; see also A. D. Johnson, Music Copyrights: 
The Need for an Appropriate Fair Use Analysis in Digital Sampling Infringement Suits, 21 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 135, 138 (1993) (arguing that the fair use doctrine “should remain a 
viable defense to claims that sampling constitutes copyright infringement”); Michael B. 
Landau, Are the Courts Singing a Different Tune When it Comes to Music? What Ever 
Happened to Fair Use in Music Sampling Cases? 5 IP THEORY 1, 17–18 (2015) (arguing 
that the fair use doctrine should be used in music sampling cases and that the Compulsory 
License in Section 115 of the Copyright Act should be expanded to include music sampling 
under the fair use exception). 
46
 Schietinger, supra note 10 at 220. “Fair Use” is an affirmative defense which 
recognizes a legally significant portion of the work has been copied, but that copying is 
excused under the doctrine of “Fair Use,” which is statutorily built into the Copyright Act. 
Id.   
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argument for a defendant if the de minimis defense fails.47 The doctrine has 
a long and somewhat complicated history, but recent decisions and 
scholarship suggest that it could be applicable to music sampling cases.48 
Fair use in a copyright infringement action must be determined on a case-
by-case basis using a four-factor test enumerated in § 107 of the Copyright 
Act of 1976.49 
 How the copyright principles of substantial similarity, de minimis 
and fair use apply to music sampling has been the subject of debate in 
recent years.50 In situations like Vanilla Ice’s “Ice Ice Baby,” where the 
                                                 
47
 Carter, supra note 10. 
48
 See Landau, supra note 45, at 17–18 (arguing that the fair use doctrine should be 
used in music sampling cases and that the Compulsory License in Section 115 of the 
Copyright Act should be expanded to include music sampling under the fair use exception). 
See also Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that under the fair use 
doctrine there is no requirement that new work must make a comment on the old work or 
author, only that the new work be sufficiently transformative); Johnson, supra note 45 
(arguing that the fair use doctrine “should remain a viable defense to claims that sampling 
constitutes copyright infringement”). 
49
 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2016). The four factors to be analyzed by the courts are: (1) “the 
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or 
is for nonprofit educational purposes”; (2) “the nature of the copyrighted work”; (3) “the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole”; and (4) “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.” 
50
 See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A] [1]-[4]. Compare 
Carter, supra note 10, at 681–84 (criticizing the Bridgeport holding and proposing the use 
of the Fragmented Literal Similarity Test as the standard for sound recording infringement 
cases), and Cromer, supra note 10, at 283 (arguing that the “Sixth Circuit’s blanket 
disregard for substantial similarity or a de minimis test is not only improper but reckless”), 
and Galvin, supra note 10, at 539 (criticizing the Bridgeport Holding and asserting that the 
Sixth Circuit “should have affirmed the decision of the district court and dismissed the 
plaintiffs infringement claim”), and Schietinger, supra note 10, at 210 (criticizing the 
Bridgeport holding as “problematic and potentially harmful”), with Tracy L. Reilly, 
Debunking the Top Three Myths of Digital Sampling: An Endorsement of the Bridgeport 
Music Court's Attempt to Afford "Sound" Copyright Protection to Sound Recordings, 31 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 355, 362 (2008) (arguing in favor of the Bridgeport decision and 
stating that prior to Bridgeport, “neither sampling musicians nor sampled musicians were 
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unauthorized sampling was substantial, and clearly recognizable to the 
listener, there can be little doubt that, without going through the proper 
legal channels, copyright infringement has occurred.51 However, cases 
began to arise in courts where musicians had sampled very small portions of 
songs, sometimes virtually unrecognizable, but were still being sued for 
copyright infringement.52 In several of these sampling cases defendants 
employed the de minimis defense to combat the allegations of infringement, 
and in cases where a song sampled only a small portion of another song, 
these defendants were successful.53 In contrast, there is little case law on the 
                                                                                                                            
protected sufficiently by these laws and music industry practices”), and VMG Salsoul, 
LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 889 (9th Cir. 2016) (Silverman, B., dissenting) (arguing 
that Bridgeport’s arguments are “well-reasoned and persuasive,” noting Congress’ silence 
after the decision and stating that “[o]nce the sound is fixed, it is tangible property 
belonging to the copyright holder, and no one else has the right to take even a little of it 
without permission”). 
51
 See NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A]; Runtagh, supra note 5. 
52
 See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004) (defendant’s 
alleged infringement based on a six-second, three-note flute segment of plaintiff’s musical 
composition); Tuff 'N' Rumble Mgmt. v. Profile Records, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
4186 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1997) (defendant’s alleged infringement based on sampling a 
portion of plaintiff’s drum track from a prior sound recording); Jarvis v. A & M Records, 
827 F. Supp. 282, 291 (D.N.J. 1993) (defendant’s alleged infringement based on a sample 
of short vocal pieces and a keyboard riff of plaintiff’s prior sound recording); Grand 
Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(defendant’s alleged infringement based on three words taken from plaintiff's song and a 
portion of music taken from the plaintiff’s original sound recording). 
53
 See, e.g., Newton, 388 F.3d at 1197–98 (granting summary judgment to defendant 
because alleged copying was de minimis); Jean v. Bug Music, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4022, 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3176 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2002) (granting summary judgment to 
defendants because even assuming plaintiff’s phrase was protected, alleged infringement 
was de minimis); Tuff 'N' Rumble Mgmt., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4186 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 
1997) (granting summary judgment to defendants because defendant’s alleged 
infringement was not substantially similar as a matter of law). 
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defense of fair use in music sampling cases, thus, it is unclear how willing 
courts would be to accept this defense in music sampling cases.54 
 In 2005, however, Bridgeport Music Inc. v. Dimension Films Inc. 
appeared to create a sea change in the interpretation of copyright law in 
regards to the sampling of sound recordings.55 In 2001, the music publishing 
house Bridgeport Music Inc., joined by several other related entities, filed a 
law suit the Middle District of Tennessee alleging nearly 500 counts of 
copyright infringement against close to 800 defendants.56 The District Court 
severed the original complaint into 476 separate actions, which were 
whittled down to about a dozen over several years of proceedings and were 
then consolidated into the Bridgeport case.57  
 At the heart of the Bridgeport claim was a two second, three-chord 
guitar solo from the Funkadelic song “Get Off Your Ass and Jam.”58 The 
soundtrack for defendant Dimension’s movie “I Got the Hook Up” included 
the N.W.A.’s song “100 Miles and Runnin,’” which sampled and looped the 
two second guitar piece from “Get Off Your Ass and Jam” several times.59 
The defendant did not deny that the piece of music was sampled,60 but 
                                                 
54
 See, e.g., Landau, supra note 45, at 17–18. 
55
 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 804–05 (6th Cir. 2005). 
56
 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 832 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2002); Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 795. 
57
 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 795. 
58
 Id. at 796. 
59
 Id.  
60
 Id. 
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moved for summary judgment.61 The defendant argued the sample was 
legally insubstantial or de minimis and therefore did not amount to 
actionable copying, and in the alternative, even if the sampling was not de 
minimis, it was protected under the copyright doctrine of fair use.62 
 The District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s case on summary 
judgement, holding the sample at issue used by the defendant was de 
minimis and therefore not actionable.63 The District Court used two different 
tests for substantial similarity and found that after listening to the sample 
and both songs, no reasonable juror “would recognize the source of the 
sample without being told of its source,” and therefore the infringement was 
de minimis.64 
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued an 
opinion65 that reversed the lower court, and in an industry-altering decision 
held that any sampling of a recorded piece of music, regardless of how short 
                                                 
61
 Id. at 796–97. 
62
 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 838–40 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2002); Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805. 
63
 Bridgeport, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 842–43. 
64
 Id. (The District Court did a fairly detailed substantial similarity analysis, using 
both a quantitative/qualitative test as well as the “fragmented literal similarity” test on the 
sample in question.) 
65
 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 795. (The Court issued an initial opinion on the 
consolidated cases on September 7, 2004. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 
F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004).  In December 2004, the court denied defendant’s the petition for 
rehearing en banc, but a panel rehearing was granted for the issues discussed in Part II of 
the opinion, which are the issues discussed in this Note. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
Dimension Films, 401 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 2004); see infra Part II. The court noted that 
“[a]fter additional briefing and argument on rehearing, we adhere to our conclusions and 
amend the opinion to further clarify our reasoning.” Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 795. 
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or unrecognizable it may be, could be actionable for copyright 
infringement.66 Under the Bridgeport court’s interpretation of the Copyright 
Act of 1976, the copyright owner of a sound recording had the exclusive 
right to duplicate and reuse the work,67 and thus any sampling and reuse 
constituted infringement.68 The Court also declined to address the 
defendant’s alternative fair use argument.69 The ruling appeared to 
effectively do away with the de minimis defense for copyright cases 
involving sampling,70 with the Court instructing musicians flatly to “[g]et a 
license or do not sample.”71  
 The Bridgeport case, however, was not well received in the United 
States by critics and scholars.72 Nevertheless, even with the Bridgeport 
                                                 
66
 Id. at 801–02. 
67
 Id. at 801. The court noted, “[i]n other words, a sound recording owner has the 
exclusive right to ‘sample’ his own recording.” Id. 
68
 Id. 
69
 Id. at 805. The Court stated that because the lower court ruled the infringement 
was de minimis and thus there was no infringement, it was not necessary to consider the 
affirmative defense of fair use. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805. 
70
 See NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b]; Carter, supra note 10, 
at 688; Schietinger, supra note 10, at 227–30.  
71
 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801. 
72
 See NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b]; Carter, supra note 10, 
at 681–84 (criticizing the Bridgeport holding and proposing the use of the Fragmented 
Literal Similarity Test as the standard for sound recording infringement cases); Cromer, 
supra note 10, at 283 (arguing that the “Sixth Circuit’s blanket disregard for substantial 
similarity or a de minimis test is not only improper but reckless”); Galvin, supra note 10, at 
539 (criticizing the Bridgeport Holding and asserting that the Sixth Circuit “should have 
affirmed the decision of the district court and dismissed the plaintiffs infringement claim”); 
Schietinger, supra note 10, at 210 (criticizing the Bridgeport holding as “problematic and 
potentially harmful”). Moreover, even some courts, including District Courts in California, 
Florida, and Louisiana, declined to follow and instead used the traditional substantial 
similarity tests, including analyzing de minimis defenses. Steward v. West, No. 13-02449, 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186012, *25 n.8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2014) (noting that Bridgeport 
“has been criticized by courts and commentators alike” and declining to follow its 
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court’s opinion inviting Congress to address its landmark ruling,73 the 
legislature has not yet taken any action and the Supreme Court has also not 
addressed the opinion in the more than ten years since the case was 
decided.74 The Bridgeport holding remains good law in the Sixth Circuit—
which notably includes the “Music City” of Nashville—and had not been 
directly challenged, until now.75  
 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided to confront Bridgeport 
head-on in VMG Salsoul v. Ciccone.76 In Ciccone, the artist Madonna was 
sued for the use of a “horn hit”77 allegedly sampled from an earlier disco 
                                                                                                                            
holding); Batiste v. Najm, 28 F. Supp. 3d 595, 625 n.52 (E.D. La. 2014) (noting 
Bridgeport’s holding and declining to follow); Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. 
Supp. 2d 1325, 1338–1341 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (explicitly declining to follow Bridgeport’s 
holding, finding that Bridgeport’s statutory interpretation was flawed and that the 
Bridgeport court’s “policy prescriptions, however accurate they may be, do not present 
grounds for this Court to follow its direction”); EMI Records Ltd. v. Premise Media Corp. 
L.P., 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 7485 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 8, 2008) (explicitly declining to 
follow the statutory interpretation “relied upon by the court in Bridgeport Music to declare 
the bright line rule that a de minimis exception is not available”). Additionally, after the 
Bridgeport decision, David Nimmer dedicated a short section of his preeminent treatise 
Nimmer on Copyright to the decision, picking the Bridgeport court’s argument apart. 
NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b]. 
73
 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805 (noting that the Court took a “literal reading” 
approach to their interpretation of the federal statute and that “[i]f this is not what Congress 
intended or is not what they would intend now, it is easy enough for the record industry, as 
they have done in the past, to go back to Congress for a clarification or change in the law”). 
74
 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 889 (9th Cir. 2016) (Silverman, B., 
dissenting) (noting Congress’ inaction in the more than ten years since the Bridgeport 
decision). 
75
 See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 886; 84 USLW 1826, Issue No. 46, June 9, 2016. 
76
 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 874. 
77
 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 875. (The “horn hit” discussed in the case was 
alternately identified by the courts as a “horn stab,” or “horn part,” but was described as “a 
single chord that is played eleven times in Defendants’ work, Vogue.”); VMG Salsoul, 
LLC v. Ciccone, No. CV 12-05967, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184127 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 
2013). 
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track and reused in her wildly successful song “Vogue.”78 The plaintiff 
alleged that the producer of “Vogue” sampled a .23 second horn part from 
the song “Love Break” and inserted it into “Vogue.”79  
 The District Court found the sampled portion lacked sufficient 
originality to be eligible for copyright protection, and that even if it was 
copyrightable, the sampling was de minimis.80 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
explicitly declined to follow Bridgeport and affirmed, holding that a 
substantial similarity analysis must be done and that the traditional de 
minimis defense is available in infringement cases involving samples of 
copyrighted sound recordings, just like in other copyright infringement 
cases.81 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit created a circuit split which now 
subjects copyright infringement actions to different standards of legal 
analysis.82 
II.   ANALYSIS 
 
 This section will discuss and analyze the arguments presented both 
by the Bridgeport and VMG Salsoul opinions by weighing the reasoning of 
                                                 
78
 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 875. 
79
 Id. at 875–77. (The producer in question, Shep Pettibone, produced both the songs 
“Love Break” and “Vogue” and plaintiff offered the testimony of Pettibone’s assistant who 
claimed that he witnessed Pettibone direct an engineer to insert the sample from “Love 
Break” into “Vogue.” The defendant denied this allegation, however, and disputed both the 
fact that there was actual copying and, in the alternative, even if the portion used was 
copied from “Love Break” it was de minimis.) 
80
 Id. at 876. 
81
 Id. at 880–88; 84 USLW 1826, Issue No. 46, June 9, 2016. 
82
 See 84 USLW 1826, Issue No. 46, June 9, 2016; Bill Donahue, 9th Circ. Throws 
Down The Gauntlet On Music Sampling, LAW360, http://www.law360.com/articles/803236 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2016). 
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those two opinions against the background of established copyright law and 
congressional intent.  
A.    The Bridgeport Argument: “Get A License Or Do Not Sample” 
 
 The controversial portion of the Bridgeport Court’s decision focused 
narrowly on the issue of whether an admitted sampling83 of a sound 
recording required the use of a substantial similarity analysis by the courts 
to determine whether or not the use constituted infringement.84 The heart of 
the final85 Bridgeport decision is the Court’s statutory interpretation of two 
sections of the federal government’s Copyright Act of 1976: § 106 and 
§ 114.86  
                                                 
83
 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 796 (6th Cir. 2005). 
(The Court points out that, “[b]ecause defendant does not deny it, we assume that the sound 
track of Hook Up used portions of ‘100 Miles’ that included the allegedly infringing 
sample from ‘Get Off.’”) 
84
 Id. at 798. 
85
 See supra note 65. 
86
 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 799–802. (Section 106, entitled “Exclusive rights in 
copyrighted works” is the portion of the Copyright Act which explains the types of 
exclusive rights the owner of a copyright is entitled to under the Act, which are:  
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2)  to 
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3)  to 
distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public 
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4)  
in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to 
perform the copyrighted work publicly; (5)  in the case of literary, 
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work 
publicly; and (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.  
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2016).  
Section 114, in contrast, is entitled “Scope of exclusive rights in sound recordings” and sets 
forth the limitations on a copyright owner’s exclusive rights. 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2016). 
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1.     Statutory Interpretation 
 
 The Bridgeport Court focused much of their analysis on §114 of the 
Copyright Act of 1976, particularly the language of §114(b) and how it 
relates to § 106.87 The Bridgeport Court’s key argument centered on the fact 
that the Copyright Act of 1976 added the word “entirely” into the preceding 
clause from similar language found in the earlier Sound Recording Act of 
1971.88 The Court argued that this change in the statutory text demonstrated 
Congress’ intent that the owner of a sound recording copyright “has the 
exclusive right to ‘sample’ his own recording.”89 
 The Court argued that because the word “entirely” had been added 
to the predecessor statute, it demonstrated a change in Congress’ intent: if 
the new piece of music is entirely free from copying (sampling) there is no 
copyright protection, therefore if the new piece of music has any copying 
(sampling) then copyright protection automatically extends to it, regardless 
of how much was copied.90 The Bridgeport Court noted that they had 
                                                 
87
  Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 799–800; see also 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2016); NIMMER & 
NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b]. 
88
 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800. 
89
 Id. at 801. 
90
 Id. (The Court noted that they employed a “literal reading approach” to their 
statutory interpretation. Id. at 805. The Bridgeport Court cites two main sources for its 
statutory interpretation rationale: the copyright treatise Kohn on Music Licensing, an 
extensive portion of which was cited by the court in a footnote to argue that they had not 
simply pulled their statutory interpretation “out of thin air,” as well as a law review article 
by Susan J. Latham, at the time an LL.M. student in Intellectual Property at the Benjamin 
N. Cardozo School of Law. Id. at 803, n.18; Susan Latham, Newton v. Diamond: 
Measuring the Legitimacy of Unauthorized Compositional Sampling - A Clue Illuminated 
and Obscured, 26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 119, 124–27 (2003). The quoted section of 
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consulted the legislative history of the act, which appears to conflict with 
their interpretation,91 but the Court disregarded it by arguing that “the 
legislative history is of little help because digital sampling wasn’t being 
done in 1971.”92 Inextricably tied to the Bridgeport Court’s rationale for 
their statutory interpretation is their argument that sound recordings are 
distinguishable from other types of copyright infringement and thus require 
                                                                                                                            
Al and Bob Kohn’s work states that “[b]y using the words ‘entirely of an independent 
fixation’ in referring to sound recordings which may imitate or simulate the sounds of 
another, Congress may have intended that a recording containing any sounds of another 
recording would constitute infringement.” Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 803 n.18. The cited 
portion of Latham’s Law Review Note, discussing §114(b) of the copyright act reads:    
The import of this language is that it does not matter how much a digital 
sampler alters the actual sounds or whether the ordinary lay observer can 
or cannot recognize the song or the artist's performance of it. Since the 
exclusive right encompasses rearranging, remixing, or otherwise altering 
the actual sounds, the statute by its own terms precludes the use of a 
substantial similarity test. Thus, the defenses available to a defendant are 
significantly limited.  
Latham, supra at 125. 
       
91
 See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 883–84 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding 
that the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 for § 114 indicates that Congress 
intended that liability for infringement attach “whenever all or any substantial portion” of 
the sound recording is reproduced and used without authorization); see also NIMMER & 
NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b] (arguing that the legislative history of § 114 
“debunks the [Bridgeport] court’s imputation that Congress, when adopting Section 114, 
intended to dispense with traditional notions of substantial similarity”). For context, the full 
passage of the legislative history for § 114 reads:  
Subsection (b) of section 114 makes clear that statutory protection for 
sound recordings extends only to the particular sounds of which the 
recording consists, and would not prevent a separate recording of another 
performance in which those sounds are imitated. Thus, infringement 
takes place whenever all or any substantial portion of the actual sounds 
that go to make up a copyrighted sound recording are reproduced in 
phonorecords by repressing, transcribing, recapturing off the air, or any 
other method, or by reproducing them in the soundtrack or audio portion 
of a motion picture or other audiovisual work. Mere imitation of a 
recorded performance would not constitute a copyright infringement 
even where one performer deliberately sets out to simulate another's 
performance as exactly as possible. 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 5721 (1976). 
       
92
 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805. 
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different treatment under the Copyright Act.93 Based on the Court’s 
interpretation of the Copyright Act, Bridgeport created a bright line rule, 
holding that the sampling and subsequent re-use of a sound recording in 
another medium, no matter what size, constituted a per se infringement.94 
The court thus held the substantial similarity test, and accordingly de 
minimis, did not apply in the context of music sampling.95  
2.   “Sweat of the Brow” and Other Policy Rationales 
 
 In addition to their statutory interpretation, the Bridgeport Court 
also introduced several policy arguments as to why they believed their new 
bright line rule was both desirable and proper.96 One of the Court’s 
rationales was what amounts to a “sweat of the brow” argument—the artist 
who is being sampled should not have the fruit of his labor taken without 
compensation.97 The Court said that fragments of songs taken in sampling 
cases are valuable,98 and argued that artists would not sample otherwise, 
because it either saves the artist time, adds something to the new recording, 
                                                 
        
93
 Id. at 802. The court explained: “[f]or the sound recording copyright holder, it is 
not the ‘song’ but the sounds that are fixed in the medium of his choice. When those 
sounds are sampled they are taken directly from that fixed medium. It is a physical taking 
rather than an intellectual one.” Id. 
       
94
 Id. at 801. 
        
95
 Id. at 801–02. 
        
96
 Id. at 802–05. 
97
 See discussion infra Part II. B. 2.   
       
98
 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 802. The Court argued that even small samples are 
valuable to the sampling artist either because it saved the artist the time and money of 
having to recreate that piece of music for the new work, or because the sampled piece of 
music has a particular “sound” that is recognizable and thus valuable to the new recording. 
Id. 
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or both.99 The Court also said their holding would create “ease of 
enforcement,” telling artists flatly: “Get a license or do not sample.”100 The 
Court argued that without this bright line rule, fact finders would be subject 
to “mental, musicological, and technological gymnastics” in trying to apply 
a de minimis or substantial similarity analysis.101  
B.     The Ninth Circuit’s Response To Bridgeport 
 
 In VMG Salsoul, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 
District Court’s summary judgement ruling for the defendant because even 
if proved, the alleged infringement was de minimis.102 The Ninth Circuit 
said it declined to follow Bridgeport because it disagreed with Bridgeport’s 
statutory interpretation of the Copyright Act and that, regardless of the 
policy arguments advanced by the Bridgeport Court, they were bound to 
follow Congress’ intent.103 
1.    Addressing Bridgeport’s Statutory Interpretation 
 
 The VMG Salsoul Court notes as a basic premise that 17 U.S.C. 
§ 114(b), which Bridgeport read to expand the sound recording copyright 
                                                 
        
99
 Id. 
       
100
 Id. at 801. The Court points out that artists are free to imitate those portions of 
songs they would like to replicate, but copying and reusing a sample is forbidden under 
their interpretation of the Copyright Act. Id. at 802. In another policy argument, the court 
also contends that the music industry will be able to create workable guidelines for sample 
licensing, that the majority of musicians apparently already go through this sample 
licensing process and that for defendants it would “appear to be cheaper to license than to 
litigate.” Id. at 802–04. 
        
101
 Id. at 802. 
       
102
 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2016). 
103
 See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 884–87. 
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holder’s rights, actually seeks to define the limits of copyright protection, 
and therefore the Bridgeport Court’s use of that statute to expand a 
copyright holder’s power was questionable.104 The Court points out that the 
legislative history of the Act supports this proposition because it shows that 
§ 106 of the Copyright Act, which explains the nature of a copyright 
holder’s exclusive rights, is subject to the limitations of §§ 107—118, 
including § 114, and “‘must be read in conjunction with those 
provisions.’”105  
 The Ninth Circuit then directly confronted the key behind 
Bridgeport’s reasoning: the inference the Bridgeport Court read into their 
statutory interpretation of §114(b).106
 
The VMG Court held that the 
                                                 
104
 Id. at 883. The Ninth Circuit explains that “[w]e ordinarily would hesitate to read 
an implicit expansion of rights into Congress’ statement of an express limitation on rights.” 
Id. 
105
 Id. The Court also points out that 17 U.S.C. § 102, which generally defines the 
areas protected by copyright law and 17 U.S.C. § 106, which explains the exclusive rights 
the owner of a copyright retains, treats sound recordings no differently than any other type 
of protected work. Id. at 881–83. 
106
 Id. at 883–85. As previously noted, one of the basic premises Bridgeport relies on 
is that because Congress added the word “entirely” into the wording of §114(b), it 
demonstrated Congress’ intent that the owners of a copyright of a sound recording have an 
exclusive right to the use and recreation of their own work. See discussion supra Part II. A. 
Throughout much of the opinion relating to Bridgeport, the Ninth Circuit impliedly follows 
parts of the critique by Professor David Nimmer of the Bridgeport decision in Nimmer on 
Copyright. Compare NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b] with VMG 
Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 880–88. In the section addressing the Bridgeport decision, Nimmer 
succinctly summarizes the Bridgeport court’s logical syllogism regarding §114(b): “That 
sentence immunizes the maker of a sound-alike recording; if no sounds are recaptured, the 
newcomer is categorically exempt from liability to the owner of the sound recording. From 
that proposition, the panel summarily reasons that if some sounds are recaptured, the 
newcomer’s liability is complete.” NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b]. 
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reasoning in Bridgeport is based on a “logical fallacy.”107 The Court’s 
argument was: based on the premise that adding the word “entirely” into the 
statutory text of § 114(b) means that Congress intended no liability should 
attach when none of a sound recording was used in another piece of music, 
it does not logically follow for the Bridgeport Court to infer that liability 
should then automatically attach when any of the sound recording is used in 
another piece of music.108  
 The Court pointed out that, “[a] statement that rights do not extend 
to a particular circumstance does not automatically mean that the rights 
extend to all other circumstances,”109 and demonstrated this by giving an 
example following the logic behind the Bridgeport Court’s statutory 
interpretation.110 The Ninth Circuit supported their challenge to Bridgeport’s 
statutory interpretation with the legislative history of § 114 that Bridgeport 
                                                 
107
 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 884. This language again comes from Nimmer. NIMMER 
& NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b]. 
108
 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 884–85. 
109
 Id. at 884. 
110
 Id. at 885. The example used by the Ninth Circuit in VMG Salsoul does an 
excellent job of succinctly demonstrating the logical flaw in Bridgeport’s reasoning:  
For example, take as a given the proposition that “if it has rained, then 
the grass is not dry.” It does not necessarily follow that “if it has not 
rained, then the grass is dry.” Someone may have watered the lawn, for 
instance. We cannot infer the second if-then statement from the first. The 
first if-then statement does not tell us anything about the condition of the 
grass if it has not rained. Accordingly, even though it is true that, “if the 
recording consists entirely of independent sounds, then the copyright 
does not extend to it,” that statement does not necessarily mean that “if 
the recording does not consist entirely of independent sounds, then the 
copyright does extend to it.” 
Id. 
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dismissed,111 which conflicts with the Bridgeport Court’s reading of the 
Copyright Act.112 
2.    “Sweat of the Brow” and Policy Arguments  
 
 The VMG Salsoul Court also took exception to two other arguments 
advanced by Bridgeport. First, the argument that even small portions of 
music recordings sampled are valuable and thus the original artist’s efforts 
should be protected,113 essentially making a “sweat of the brow” 
argument,114 and second, that because the sounds sampled are “fixed in the 
medium,” (they are already recorded onto a tape, or saved electronically) 
and the sample directly replicates that sound, “[i]t is a physical taking rather 
than an intellectual one.”115  
                                                 
111
  Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 805 (6th Cir. 2005). In 
that legislative history, Congress notes that “infringement takes place whenever all or any 
substantial portion of the actual sounds that go to make up a copyrighted sound recording 
are reproduced.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 5721 (1976). This is at odds with the 
Bridgeport Court’s interpretation of the Copyright Act. VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 883.  
112
 Id.  
113
 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 802 (6th Cir. 2005). 
The court notes that “even when a small part of a sound recording is sampled, the part 
taken is something of value . . . [w]hen those sounds are sampled they are taken directly 
from that fixed medium. It is a physical taking rather than an intellectual one.” Id. 
114
 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) 
(explaining that some courts had misconstrued the Copyright Act and used the “sweat of 
the brow” argument to uphold copyright infringement cases dealing with compilations of 
facts with no original expression, noting, “these courts developed a new theory to justify 
the protection of factual compilations. Known alternatively as "sweat of the brow" or 
‘industrious collection,’ the underlying notion was that copyright was a reward for the hard 
work that went into compiling facts.”). 
115
 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 802. 
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The Ninth Circuit dismissed Bridgeport’s “sweat of the brow” 
argument relying on Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.116 The Ninth 
Circuit argued that in Feist, the Supreme Court held “unequivocally that the 
Copyright Act protects only the expressive aspects of a copyrighted work 
and not the ‘fruit of the [author’s] labor.’”117 Addressing the second 
argument, the Ninth Circuit held that a “physical taking,” as opposed to an 
intellectual one, can happen across the copyright law spectrum, and gave 
the example of copying a photograph118 to note that the de minimis principle 
applies in all of those comparable situations.119 The Court stated, “we can 
think of no principled reason to differentiate one kind of ‘physical taking’ 
from another.”120 
                                                 
116
 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 349 (holding that the “sweat of the brow” doctrine used 
extensively by lower courts was improper because it defied basic copyright principles). 
117
 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 885. See also Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 
499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991). The Supreme Court, talking about striking down the “sweat of 
the brow” argument courts had used for years to uphold copyright infringement actions, 
said:  
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler's labor may be 
used by others without compensation. As Justice Brennan has correctly 
observed, however, this is not “some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory 
scheme.” It is, rather, “the essence of copyright,” and a constitutional 
requirement. The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the 
labor of authors, but “to promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts.”  
Id. (citations omitted). 
       
118
 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 885. The Court’s argument is that in the same way a 
music sample makes an “exact” replica of the original sound recording, someone reprinting 
or photocopying a photograph is an “exact” replica of the original photograph, thus the 
distinction is arbitrary. Id. 
       
119
 Id. 
       
120
 Id. 
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 Lastly, the Ninth Circuit addressed Bridgeport’s policy reasoning 
for establishing the bright line rule of “get a license or do not sample”121 by 
arguing that regardless of the policy arguments advanced by a judge, the 
Federal Circuit Courts are tasked with interpreting and following the desire 
of the legislature through the statutes and laws they enact.122  
C.    Addressing Bridgeport, VMG Salsoul, And The Resulting Circuit Split 
 
 The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in VMG Salsoul created a Federal 
circuit split which now subjects litigants to different rules of law depending 
on where they file their lawsuit.123 Unless and until the Supreme Court or 
Congress decides to address the issue, other courts tasked with deciding 
similar lawsuits will be faced with an undecided area of law.124 In order to 
address this issue, a weighing of the arguments behind Bridgeport and VMG 
Salsoul is helpful. 
                                                 
       
121
 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005). 
       
122
 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 887. The Ninth Circuit points out that Bridgeport’s 
policy arguments “are for a legislature, not a court. They speak to what Congress could 
decide; they do not inform what Congress actually decided.” Id. The Ninth Circuit also 
disregarded the argument made by Judge Silverman in the opinion’s dissent that because 
Congress has not intervened, Bridgeport has “correctly divined congressional intent,” 
adding: 
[t]he Supreme Court has held that congressional inaction in the face of a 
judicial statutory interpretation, even with respect to the Supreme Court's 
own decisions affecting the entire nation, carries almost no 
weight . . . . Here, Congress’ inaction with respect to a decision by one 
circuit court has even less import, especially considering that many other 
courts have declined to apply Bridgeport's rule. 
Id. 
        
123
 84 U.S.L.W. 1826 (2016). 
124
 Id. 
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 Prior to Bridgeport, there was not a large body of copyright case law 
which dealt specifically with music sampling, but courts applied a 
substantial similarity and de minimis analysis to copyright cases, including 
sampling cases, almost universally.125 In fact, courts have recognized the 
concept of substantial similarity as being a basic tenant of copyright 
protection dating back to 1841 in the case of Folsom v. Marsh.126 In VMG 
Salsoul, the Ninth Circuit decided to continue applying those long-standing 
principles of substantial similarity and de minimis to music sampling cases 
                                                 
125
 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 881 (finding that “courts consistently have applied the 
rule in all cases alleging copyright infringement”). This included the Sixth Circuit as well, 
prior to the Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Bridgeport. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 839–40 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). In fact, the lower 
District Court in Bridgeport explicitly said in their initial ruling that the Circuit recognized 
the concept as applying to copyright infringement cases, and cited to a case from 1943 
which held so, writing: 
The Sixth Circuit has recognized that the principle of de minimis non 
curat lex (“the law cares not for trifles”) can be applied as a defense to 
copyright infringement if it can be shown that a substantial amount of the 
copyrighted work was not taken. 
Id. See also Galvin, supra note 10 at 532–33; Carter supra note 10 at 677; Schietinger 
supra note 10 at 218–19. But see Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 
F. Supp. 182, 183–85 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that defendants intentionally violated 
plaintiff’s copyrights by using three words from plaintiff's song and sampling a portion of 
the plaintiff’s master recording without permission on defendant’s album and finding for 
the plaintiff without doing any kind of substantial similarity analysis). The court in Grand 
Upright Music started out the opinion ominously quoting “Thou shall not steal,” the 
Seventh Commandment from Exodus in the Bible. Id. at 183. The court was so vexed that 
the defendant had intentionally appropriated the material that they referred the case to the 
United States Attorney to look into criminal charges. Id. at 185. Grand Upright Music, 
however was one of the earliest reported sampling cases and is the minority of 
infringement cases which haven’t applied some type of substantial similarity analysis. See 
Galvin supra note 10 at 532–33; Carter supra note 10 at 677; Schietinger supra note 10 at 
218–19. 
126
 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.  
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and declined to follow Bridgeport, which rejected those principles in the 
context of music sampling.127  
 Thus, in comparing the two holdings the essential question becomes 
whether Bridgeport’s bright line rule passes muster and should overturn the 
decades-old copyright case law principles to which VMG Salsoul adheres. It 
follows that the Bridgeport opinion must demonstrate a compelling 
argument as to why courts should do so. The Sixth Circuit attempted to do 
this by arguing: (1) Congress specifically intended for sound recordings to 
be protected to a greater extent than all other copyrightable works in the 
Copyright Act; and (2) music sampling is distinguishable in a meaningful 
way from all other types of copyright infringement cases.  
1.    Statutory Interpretation of the Copyright Act 
 
 Comparing the statutory interpretation of the Copyright Act of 1976 
in the context of music sampling by both the Bridgeport and VMG Salsoul 
Courts, the stronger argument is advanced by the Ninth Circuit. The Court’s 
position in VMG Salsoul is that Congress did not intend for § 114 of the 
Copyright Act to treat sound recordings any differently, as the Bridgeport 
court holds, and that based on the legislative history, Congress intended that 
                                                 
127
 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 803 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(finding the de minimis defense did not apply to sound recordings under federal copyright 
law and any unauthorized copying of sampled music, no matter how small or insignificant, 
could constitute copyright infringement). 
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a substantial similarity and de minimis analysis should be conducted for 
music sampling cases.128  
 First, looking at the Bridgeport Court’s logic reasoning, the Ninth 
Circuit is correct: it does not follow that because Congress intended for no 
liability for infringement to attach when none of a sound recording was 
used in another piece of music that liability should automatically attach 
when any of the sound recording is used in another piece of music. As 
pointed out by the Ninth Circuit and David Nimmer in Nimmer on 
Copyright, there is an unsupported inferential leap made in that reasoning.129  
 In terms of formal logic, the syllogism proposed by the Sixth Circuit 
in Bridgeport is called “the fallacy of affirming the consequent.”130 The 
                                                 
128
 See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 886. 
129
 See discussion supra Part II. 2. A; see also VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 884–85; 
NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b]; Galvin, supra note 10, at 537–38; 
Schietinger, supra note 10, at 239–44. As Professor Nimmer points out in discussing the 
flaws in Bridgeport’s statutory interpretation of § 114(b): 
That sentence immunizes the maker of a sound-alike recording; if no 
sounds are recaptured, the newcomer is categorically exempt from 
liability to the owner of the sound recording. From that proposition, the 
panel summarily reasons that if some sounds are recaptured, the 
newcomer’s liability is complete. But it is submitted that that conclusion 
rests on a logical fallacy. By validating entire sound-alike recordings, the 
quoted sentence contains no implication that partial sound duplications 
are to be treated any differently from what is required by the traditional 
standards of copyright law—which, for decades prior to adoption of the 
1976 Act and unceasingly in the decades since, has included the 
requirement of substantial similarity.  
NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b]. 
130
 Stephen M. Rice, Conspicuous Logic: Using the Logical Fallacy of Affirming the 
Consequent as a Litigation Tool, 14 BARRY L. REV., 1, 10–12 (2010). The author explains 
with an example how this type of logical fallacy works: 
The Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent takes a similar, but 
logically different, form from that of a well-formed hypothetical 
syllogism. For example: 1. If assent to enter into a contract is made 
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basic tenant of this logical flaw is that when there is a conditional “if-then” 
statement (i.e. If A then necessarily B), it is a fallacy to infer the inverse of 
the conditional based solely on the conditional (i.e. If B then necessarily A), 
because the initial statement only provides that a limited premise is true, it 
does not provide any information about the inverse of that condition.131 
Thus, given the premise of the statement in § 114(b):132 If a sound recording 
is a complete copy of another sound recording, then exclusive rights do not 
extend to it, it cannot be properly deduced: If exclusive rights do extend to 
the sound recording, then the sound recording is not copied at all (i.e. it is 
free from copying). 
 One cannot properly take the “if-then” conditional statement in 
§114(b), and assume the inverse is necessarily true.133 To do so would be 
                                                                                                                            
because of an improper threat that leaves the victim no reasonable 
alternative, then the contract is voidable by the victim.  
2. The contract is voidable by the victim. 3. Therefore, the assent to 
enter into the contract was made because of an improper threat. 
Understanding the nature of this logically invalid argument and why it is 
logically invalid (and legally incorrect) requires an understanding of the 
rules governing validity of hypothetical syllogisms. A hypothetical 
syllogism must meet two basic logical rules in order to have a 
deductively valid form. If the form of the syllogism is invalid, then the 
syllogism cannot be relied upon to ensure the truth of the conclusion. 
Where a syllogism violates one of these rules of logical form, the 
syllogism is invalid, and the argument is said to be fallacious. 
Id. 
131
 Id. 
132
 See discussion supra Part II A. 1. 
133
  Id. This concept is clearly demonstrated by the Ninth Circuit’s example in VMG 
Salsoul. VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 885 (9th Cir. 2016). The court’s 
example shows the logical reasoning problem with Bridgeport’s interpretation: 
For example, take as a given the proposition that “if it has rained, 
then the grass is not dry.” It does not necessarily follow that “if it has not 
rained, then the grass is dry.” Someone may have watered the lawn, for 
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affirming the consequent. That is not to say that is impossible for the 
consequent (Bridgeport’s premise) to be true, only that one cannot simply 
infer it from the conditional statement in § 114 alone. In the case of the 
premise in § 114, to prove the consequent is true would require some type 
of outside support to show that Congress actually intended that sound 
recordings are afforded absolute protection against copying and re-use, as 
opposed to all other mediums which are subject to a substantial similarity 
analysis.134  
 Additional support to bolster the Bridgeport Court’s interpretation 
of Congressional intent would normally be found in the legislative history 
or through other anecdotal evidence of Congressional intent, but the 
legislative history for the Copyright Act that Bridgeport dismissed actually 
demonstrates the opposite of what Bridgeport concludes.135 As the Ninth 
Circuit points out, Congress notes in the legislative history of § 114 of the 
Copyright Act that, “infringement takes place whenever all or any 
substantial portion of the actual sounds that go to make up a copyrighted 
sound recording are reproduced.”136  
                                                                                                                            
instance. We cannot infer the second if-then statement from the first. The 
first if-then statement does not tell us anything about the condition of the 
grass if it has not rained. 
Id. 
134
 See discussion supra Part II. 2. A; see also VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 884–85; 
NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b]. 
135
 See discussion supra Part II. 2. A.  
136
 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 5721 (1976) (emphasis added). 
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 The only reasonable reading of this statement is that Congress 
intended for infringement liability to attach when an alleged infringer 
copies and reuses “all or any substantial portion” of the work without 
authorization. Therefore, this would logically require courts to do some 
form of substantial similarity analysis when dealing with copyright 
infringement cases to determine when a “substantial portion” of the work 
has been copied and reused.137 Furthermore, because courts have applied de 
minimis to copyright infringement cases under the substantial similarity 
test,138 it would also logically require courts to determine whether the 
alleged infringement is de minimis. In addition, while the language in the 
Copyright Act did change from the earlier Sound Recording Act of 1971, 
the legislative history which Bridgeport dismissed as being irrelevant was 
written at the same time that Congress changed the statutory language, 
which further suggests that Congress did intend that sound recordings be 
subject to a substantial similarity analysis.139 Thus, as the Ninth Circuit 
concluded in VMG Salsoul, the legislative history tends to rebut the 
Bridgeport Court’s inference that § 114 of the Copyright Act treats sound 
                                                 
137
  See discussion supra Part I. This would be faithful to the body of copyright law 
dating back to the 1800’s which requires such analysis. Id.  
138
 See discussion supra Part I. 
139
 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976). 
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recordings differently and therefore they are not subject to substantial 
similarity and de minimis tests, as Bridgeport suggests.140  
 In addition to the legislative history, another issue with Bridgeport’s 
statutory interpretation of § 114 is that it lacks solid support from secondary 
sources. Although the Court states that they did not pull their “interpretation 
out of thin air,”141 the material they cite for support is unconvincing. First, 
the court cites to a section of the treatise Kohn on Music Licensing, which 
proposes the same interpretation of § 114 that the Bridgeport Court 
reached.142 The problem is not the source itself, but what the source says. 
The quoted section of Kohn is not definitive in its reasoning, as it states, 
“Congress may have intended that a recording containing any sounds of 
another recording would constitute infringement.”143 The treatise merely 
posits that this may have been Congress’ intent, and aside from this 
tentative interpretation, the treatise provides no other support for the 
proposition or how the authors reached that conclusion.144  
 The other source the Bridgeport Court cites for support of its 
statutory interpretation is a student-written law review note which provides 
little analytical reasoning aside from making the same logical inference 
                                                 
140
 See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 886. 
141
 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 803 (6th Cir. 2005). 
142
 Id. at 803 n.18. 
143
 AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING, 1486-87 (Aspen Law & 
Business 3d ed. 2002) (emphasis added). 
144
 Id.  
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regarding § 114(b) of the Copyright Act that Bridgeport relies on.145 The 
Note, written by Susan J. Latham, only cites for support of this 
interpretation a lecture by law professor Justin Hughes.146 This is not to 
imply that the student Note or Professor Hughes are not valid sources. The 
problem, however, is that like with Kohn, there is no explanation available 
to determine the logic or thought process of the statutory interpretation they 
advocate, nor on what they based their own understanding of the Copyright 
Act.147 Moreover, Latham herself acknowledges in a footnote that despite 
this interpretation of § 114, de minimis may still be a valid defense, writing, 
“[t]here may be the possibility of a de minimis use defense, depending on 
how strictly the court interprets the ‘actual sounds’ language in the 
statute.”148  
 This lack of secondary support, combined with the fact that the 
Court’s interpretation rests on an inference which is not based in sound 
logical reasoning and not maintained by the legislative history, 
demonstrates that the Sixth Circuit’s arguments in Bridgeport are not 
convincing. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit’s statutory interpretation of the 
Copyright Act in VMG Salsoul is grounded in logical arguments, bolstered 
by legislative history and adheres to the long-standing principles of 
                                                 
         
145
 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801 n.10; Latham, supra note 90, at 125. 
        
146
 Latham, supra note 90, at 125 n.33. Latham states in the footnote that her notes 
from the lecture are “on file with the author.” Id. 
147
 Latham, supra note 90, at 125 n.33.  
        
148
 Latham, supra note 90, at 125 n.35; see also Carter, supra note 10, at 686–87. 
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copyright law. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s statutory interpretation is the more 
persuasive argument.  
2.    Distinguishing Sound Recordings from other Copyright Protected 
Mediums 
 
 A key piece of reasoning behind the Bridgeport decision was the 
Court’s dismissal of the legislative history of the Copyright Act.149 The 
Court said it did so because copyright infringement via music sampling of 
sound recordings was not being done, or at least was not a problem, in the 
early 1970’s when the Copyright Act was written.150 This argument might 
be persuasive if sampling music from a sound recording was demonstrably 
different from other forms of copyright infringement. If sampling a sound 
recording is somehow legally distinguishable from copying and reusing 
work from other mediums, then dismissing the legislative intent—which 
was written at a time when Congress could not have realistically foreseen 
the type of widespread music sampling which began in the 1980’s—is at 
least a reasonable proposition.151   
 The problem, however, is that there is no meaningful distinction 
between taking a small portion of a sound recording and reusing it in 
                                                 
149
 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805. 
150
 Id. 
151
 In theory, this would be a meaningful distinction, because if Congress could not 
have foreseen such events when drafting the Copyright Act of 1976 it follows that it would 
not be helpful to refer to the legislative history as it will merely explain the thought process 
behind the Act at a time when Congress was unaware and unprepared to deal with the type 
of sampling at issue. 
2017] SPLIT CHORDS: ADDRESSING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 171 
another work, and taking a small portion of a photo, a video, or a drawing 
and reusing that in another work.152 In other words, the distinction the 
Bridgeport court attempts to make is an arbitrary one.153 This is the Ninth 
Circuit’s argument in VMG Salsoul—that other copyright infringement 
cases deal with “physical takings,” but are still subject to a substantial 
similarity analysis, thus the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning is flawed.154  
 The Bridgeport Court argued that music sampling is a “physical 
taking rather than an intellectual one.”155 However, a video recording 
                                                 
152
 See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b]. As Professor 
Nimmer points out: 
Whether the conduct at issue is sound duplication or sound imitation, 
the defendant who would create a new work must fix materials into a 
tangible medium of expression; a distinction based on “physical 
copying” versus something else thus seems to be built on air. It is 
therefore difficult to subscribe to the court’s conclusion that sampling 
represents “a physical taking rather than an intellectual one.” 
Id. See also Galvin, supra note 10, at 537–38; Schietinger, supra note 10, at 239–44.  
153
 See NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b] (arguing Bridgeport’s 
premise that sampling involves a physical, rather than intellectual taking based on the fact 
that sounds are “fixed in the medium” appears to be “built on air”). Outside of the 
Bridgeport decision, this distinction is not found in any other case law and is supported by 
very little. See, e.g., Galvin, supra note 10, at 537–38 (“If digital sampling is considered a 
physical taking from the sound recording, then why is it not also one from the musical 
composition (which the sound recording contains)? Both copyrights require that the work 
be fixed in a tangible medium; a musical score on paper is certainly no less tangible than a 
compact disc. At best, the court's distinction between taking from a sound recording and 
taking from the musical composition is unconvincing.”); Schietinger, supra note 10, at 
239–44 (“The Sixth Circuit improperly describes sampling as a physical rather than 
intellectual taking”); but see Reilly, supra note 50, at 362 (arguing in favor of the 
Bridgeport decision and stating that prior to Bridgeport, “neither sampling musicians nor 
sampled musicians were protected sufficiently by these laws and music industry 
practices”), and VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 889 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(Silverman, B., dissenting) (arguing that Bridgeport’s arguments are “well-reasoned and 
persuasive,” noting Congress’ silence after the decision and stating that “[o]nce the sound 
is fixed, it is tangible property belonging to the copyright holder, and no one else has the 
right to take even a little of it without permission”). 
154
 See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 885. 
155
 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 802. 
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contains sounds and images which are also “fixed in the medium”156 when 
the recording is made, just as the sounds of the musical instruments are in a 
sound recording. Likewise, as the Ninth Circuit asserts, the images in a 
photograph are “fixed in the medium” when the photograph is captured, 
printed and reused.157 Therefore, whether it is a photograph, a piece of 
recorded music, or a video clip which is copied and reused by the alleged 
infringer, there is no sound logical argument as to why any of these 
mediums should be treated differently.158 Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit 
points out, there is no distinction drawn between these mediums in the 
Copyright Act itself.159 
 It appears the Bridgeport court incorrectly focused on the fact that 
the copying done in sampling is exact, rather than focusing on what is more 
important in the context of the case: is the portion copied significant enough 
to constitute substantial similarity to the original work?160 Thus, the fact that 
copyright infringement was not taking place through music sampling in the 
                                                 
156
 Id. 
157
 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 885. 
158
 As an example, imagine one were to take an exact copy of Lewis Hine’s iconic 
photograph “Sitting Atop a Skyscraper,” and then use a tiny, unrecognizable portion of it in 
a collage or another work of art. Even if that person freely admitted they had physically 
copied the piece from Hine’s photograph, unless the portion of the work they took from the 
photograph is recognizable to the average person, it is very likely that the copying would 
be considered de minimis and thus, not actionable, if one follows the holdings of the courts 
aside from Bridgeport. See supra note 153. How this example of reusing a small 
unrecognizable portion of a photograph in another work is different from taking a tiny, 
unrecognizable portion of a song and reusing it in another song is hard to follow. 
159
 See supra note 105. 
160
 NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [E][1]. 
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1970’s is irrelevant; copyright infringement was taking place in various 
other forums of copyright law at the time, including various other types of 
“physical takings” from other mediums, and the same principles of 
substantial similarity applied in those matters.161 Therefore, the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning that there is no meaningful distinction between sampling 
and other forms of copyright infringement is logically sound, and the better 
argument. 
3.   Policy Arguments 
 
 While Bridgeport’s policy arguments162 seem well-reasoned, as the 
Ninth Circuit argues in VMG Salsoul, courts are directed to interpret 
Congress’ intent to the best of their abilities.163 On its face, ease of 
                                                 
161
 See, e.g., Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 216 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(finding the defendant's use of exact reproductions of plaintiff's photographs in the movie 
“Seven” was de minimis because the plaintiff’s photographs “as used in the movie are not 
displayed with sufficient detail for the average lay observer to identify even the subject 
matter of the photographs, much less the style used in creating them”); Vault Corp. v. 
Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 267–68 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding the 30 character 
sequence copied by defendant out of 50 pages of software source coding “constituted a 
quantitatively minor amount” and was thus de minimis); Toulmin v. Rike-Kumler Co., 137 
U.S.P.Q. 533, 534–35 (S.D. Ohio 1962) (finding defendant's copying of one sentence and 
half of another from plaintiff's historical book and subsequent reuse in his novel to be de 
minimis because the defendant’s use of such a small portion of plaintiff’s book “represents 
neither a substantial nor material part of the latter,” and “was insignificant in value and 
extent of the copyrighted material”). 
162
 See discussion supra Part II. 1. C. 
163
 See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 887. See also John F. Manning, Textualism and 
Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 419 (2005). The author notes: 
For much of our history, the Supreme Court has unflinchingly 
proclaimed that legislative “intent” is the touchstone of federal statutory 
interpretation. The rationale is familiar: In a constitutional system 
predicated upon legislative supremacy (within constitutional boundaries), 
judges—as Congress’s faithful agents—must try to ascertain as 
accurately as possible what Congress meant by the words it used. 
Id. 
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enforcement sounds like a useful judicial improvement, but it is not 
necessarily an improvement at all if the method used to accomplish this 
goal does not comport with copyright case law and congressional intent. If 
Congress truly intended that sound recordings be treated the same as all 
other mediums in regards to copyright protection as the legislative history 
suggests,164 then policy arguments made by judges should not override the 
legislature’s intent, as the Supreme Court established in SEC v. Joiner.165 
When dealing with a case involving interpreting federal statutes such as the 
Copyright Act, the Federal Circuit Courts are not to ignore legislative intent 
and insert their own policy arguments, they are to interpret the desire of the 
legislature and decide the case according to that rationale.166 Thus, the 
Federal courts should aim for fidelity in interpreting Congressional intent, 
and because the Ninth Circuit’s argument is consistent with Congress’ 
intent, it is more persuasive.167 
                                                 
164
 See discussion supra Part II. 1. C. 
165
 SEC v. Joiner, 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943). The Supreme Court noted that the 
federal courts are to decipher to the best of their ability the legislature’s intent when 
attempting to interpret federal statutes: 
However well these rules may serve at times to aid in deciphering 
legislative intent, they long have been subordinated to the doctrine that 
courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its 
dominating general purpose, will read text in the light of context and will 
interpret the text so far as the meaning of the words fairly permits so as to 
carry out in particular cases the generally expressed legislative policy. 
Id. 
166
 See Manning, supra note 163, at 419 n.1. See also Joiner, 320 U.S. at 350-51; 
VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 887 (9th Cir. 2016). The Ninth Circuit 
points out that Bridgeport’s policy arguments “are for a legislature, not a court. They speak 
to what Congress could decide; they do not inform what Congress actually decided.” Id. 
167
 See note 178 infra.  
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4.   Comparing the Holdings and Their Effects 
 
 Because the Sixth Circuit’s arguments discussed above are 
unconvincing and the Ninth Circuit’s contrary arguments are logical, 
grounded in established copyright case law and comport with the legislative 
intent available for the Copyright Act, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in VMG 
Salsoul is superior. The effect of Bridgeport’s bright line rule on music 
sampling litigants since 2005 is unclear, in part because there are so few 
sampling cases which have made it to trial.168 However, the implication of 
holding that any sampling is per se copyright infringement is fairly clear: it 
gives the music publishing companies the upper hand in negotiating 
sampling licenses and discourages artists from sampling other musical 
works without getting a license.169  
 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit’s holding, which requires courts ruling 
on music sampling infringement cases to do a substantial similarity and de 
minimis analysis, at least in theory, should help to readjust the balance 
                                                 
168
 Suppappola, supra note 9, at 125. 
169
 See Schietinger supra note 10 at 234; see also Thomas P. Wolf, Toward a “New 
School” Licensing Regime for Digital Sampling: Disclosure, Coding, and Click-Through, 
2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 9 (2011) (“Bridgeport, if generalized into a nationally 
applicable standard for sampling, will dramatically increase the transaction costs associated 
with sampling, forcing artists to acquire both musical composition and sound recording 
licenses for all their samples, regardless of whether or not such samples would have 
previously been held to constitute non-infringing uses.”); Steven D. Kim, Taking De 
Minimis out of the Mix: The Sixth Circuit Threatens to Pull the Plug on Digital Sampling in 
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 13 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 103, 130–
31 (2006) (Noting that “[s]hould the Supreme Court similarly deny certiorari in Bridgeport, 
musicians will face both costly and complex licenses for samples, or potentially face 
equally costly litigation—which will, in effect, pull the plug on digital sampling.”). 
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between artist creativity and artist protection by creating room for artists to 
use small samples of other works without mandating artists engage in the 
complex and expensive sample clearing process.170 How the use of a de 
minimis analysis might impact the filing of sampling infringement lawsuits 
is also unclear, because while it may encourage artists to take more risks in 
sampling without obtaining a license, which could increase litigation, it 
could also discourage music publishing companies from bringing 
infringement cases when the alleged copying is of a small portion of the 
work if courts find sampling uses to be de minimis.  
 However, with VMG Salsoul and Bridgeport coming to opposite 
conclusions in their holdings, one thing is clear: the resulting circuit split 
will subject litigants to diametrically opposed rules of law in the Ninth and 
Sixth Circuits.171 From the litigant’s perspective, this clearly incentivizes 
forum shopping,172 something Congress and the courts have sought to 
reduce as much as possible.173 
                                                 
170
 See Kembrew McLeod & Peter DiCola, Non-Infringing Uses in Digital Sampling: 
The Role of Fair Use and the De Minimis Threshold in Sample Clearance Reform, 17 
DEAKIN L. REV. 322, 323–24 (2013) (arguing that “the de minimis threshold allows 
musicians a certain freedom to borrow small building blocks,” and that “[t]he absence of 
the de minimis rule for sound recordings has broad consequences  . . . . However 
implemented, a de minimis threshold should apply to the infringement of sound recordings 
to provide leeway in copyright law’s balancing act between those who sample and those 
who have been sampled.”). 
171
  84 U.S.L.W. 1826 (2016); Lesley Grossberg, A Circuit Split at Last: Ninth Circuit 
Recognizes De Minimis Exception to Copyright Infringement of Sound Recordings, 
BAKERHOSTETLER (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).  
172
 Grossberg, supra note 171. If a copyright license holder wants to sue an alleged 
infringer over the use of a sample of the copyright protected song, it would clearly be in 
their best interest to file suit in the Sixth Circuit, as the Sixth Circuit is bound to follow 
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5.   Unresolved Issues 
 
 Both the VMG Salsoul and Bridgeport opinions still leave several 
issues unresolved. First, an underlying “slippery slope” problem remains in 
arguably all substantial similarity and de minimis determinations made by 
courts.174 These determinations can be particularly challenging in the 
context of music sampling.175 In addition, while there is debate on whether 
the real driving factor behind the Bridgeport opinion’s bright line rule was 
                                                                                                                            
Bridgeport’s bright-line “get a license or do not sample” rule. Id. Therefore any sampling, 
if proved, is per se infringement; thus all the plaintiff has to do is show that her work was 
actually copied and she wins the case, like in Bridgeport. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801–05. 
Conversely, the defendant in such a suit would have the incentive to do whatever it can to 
avoid the Sixth Circuit and attempt to get the suit heard in the Ninth Circuit or in another 
federal circuit where the lower district courts have declined to follow Bridgeport, like the 
Second or Eleventh Circuits, which have employed a substantial similarity analysis. See 
Batiste v. Najm, 28 F. Supp. 3d 595, 625 n.52 (E.D. La. 2014) (using substantial similarity 
test); Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1338–41 (S.D. Fla. 2009) 
(applying substantial similarity test). This would require the plaintiff prove not only 
copying, but copying of a legally substantial portion of her work. See discussion supra Part 
I. 
173
  See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 336–37 (2005) 
(noting that “[n]o less an authority than a United States Supreme Court Justice has 
denounced forum shopping as ‘evil.’ Congressional efforts to limit forum shopping have 
portrayed the practice as abusive, devious, and unethical.”). 
174
 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 840 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2002). The District Court in the Bridgeport case pointed out that “[t]he Court's role 
in making a de minimis analysis is a tricky one. It must balance the interests protected by 
the copyright laws against the stifling effect that overly rigid enforcement of these laws 
may have on the artistic development of new works.” See also NIMMER & NIMMER supra 
note 10 at § 13.03 [A]. Professor Nimmer points out that “[t]he determination of the extent 
of similarity that will constitute a substantial, and hence infringing, similarity presents one 
of the most difficult questions in copyright law, and one that is the least susceptible of 
helpful generalizations.” Id. 
175
 Suppappola, supra note 9 at 100–01. For example: where exactly is the legal 
threshold of de minimis when it comes to music sampling? Is it an arbitrary length—i.e. the 
cutoff for de minimis use is two seconds? Is it based on whether the “average listener” 
would recognize it? If so, how exactly does a judge or a panel of justices make a definitive 
ruling, as a matter of law, that an “average listener” would not recognize the sampled piece 
in the song? See infra Part III. 
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judicial economy,176 clogging the courts remains a potential issue.177 If 
courts are to apply a substantial similarity in every sampling case, it is not 
hard to see why having to do so for hundreds of cases would be draining on 
court resources.178 Yet another issue in this circuit split is that neither 
Bridgeport nor the Ninth Circuit addressed the argument of fair use in their 
opinions.179 There appears to be little to no case law regarding whether fair 
                                                 
176
 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 802 (6th Cir. 2005). 
The Bridgeport Court stresses that they did not create a bright line rule simply for the sake 
of judicial efficiency, writing, “[w]e would want to emphasize, however, that 
considerations of judicial economy are not what drives this opinion.” Id. But see Carter, 
supra note 10, at 681–84 (noting that “[t]he appeals court unconvincingly stressed judicial 
economy failed to dictate its rule,” and that “judicial economy seems to have driven 
Bridgeport’s bright-line rule”).  
177
  The Bridgeport court was presented with nearly 500 instances of unlicensed 
sampling by the music clearinghouse Bridgeport Music Incorporated and related music 
publishing companies. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 795. Unlike in Newton v. Diamond, another 
seminal copyright sampling case, where the Ninth Circuit dealt with a single instance of 
sampling in one song, the Bridgeport case presented the Court with several hundred 
infringement claims by one clearinghouse against dozens of alleged infringers. Newton v. 
Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 2004); Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 795. It should be 
noted for purposes of distinguishing, that Newton dealt with an alleged infringement of a 
sample in regards to a musical composition, not a sound recording, which are 
distinguishable under copyright law, as discussed in Part I, supra. Id. For a discussion of 
the differences between the two, see generally Landau, supra note 45. 
178
 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 802. The court points out that “[w]hen one considers that 
he has hundreds of other cases all involving different samples from different songs, the 
value of a principled bright-line rule becomes apparent.” Id. This is an important piece of 
context because it may go a long way towards explaining the underlying reasoning behind 
the court’s decision to create a “bright line” rule. In the next sentence, however, the court 
attempts to distance itself from the idea that they created the bright line rule simply for 
economy, noting, “[w]e would want to emphasize, however, that considerations of judicial 
economy are not what drives this opinion. If any consideration of economy is involved it is 
that of the music industry.” Id. See also Carter, supra note 10, at 681–84 (noting that “[t]he 
appeals court unconvincingly stressed judicial economy failed to dictate its rule,” and that 
“judicial economy seems to have driven Bridgeport’s bright-line rule”). 
179
 While the VMG Salsoul Court was not faced with that issue because they found 
the alleged infringement to be de minimis, the Bridgeport Court declined to address that 
argument, though the defendant raised it. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805. See also supra note 
69. 
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use might apply as a valid defense to music sampling cases,180 and this is 
particularly troublesome because the body of copyright infringement case 
law on music sampling itself is not very robust.181 
III.   PROPOSAL 
 
 In order to provide helpful dialogue in the face of the current circuit 
split, this section proposes three suggestions for courts faced with deciding 
similar cases. First, courts should follow the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and 
continue to perform substantial similarity analyses for music sampling 
cases. Second, this section proposes courts use a modified version of the 
“audience test” to determine a minimum threshold for substantial similarity 
in sampling cases in order to address the issue of judicial economy in the 
face of potentially increased music sampling litigation. Lastly, this section 
proposes that courts should also be receptive to analyzing fair use defenses 
by defendants in music sampling cases.  
A.   Sampling Cases Should Require A Substantial Similarity Analysis  
 
 Looking through the lens of copyright law, the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in VMG Salsoul is the proper analysis for courts when dealing with 
a music sampling case.182 The Ninth Circuit’s arguments are generally well 
grounded in logic and decades of copyright law, and do not suffer from the 
                                                 
180
 Suppappola, supra note 9, at 125.  
181
  Id. at 95. Since 2006 when Suppappola’s article was written, only a handful of 
additional cases on music sampling have been published. See supra note 11.  
182
 See discussion supra Part II. C. 
180 PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. [Vol. 7:1 
types of flaws in reasoning that Bridgeport does.183 Applying a substantial 
similarity and de minimis analysis to music sampling copyright 
infringement cases as the Ninth Circuit did in VMG Salsoul comports with 
long-standing copyright law principles, Congress’ legislative intent, and the 
long line of cases which have followed those principles.184 Thus, when faced 
with a copyright infringement lawsuit involving music sampling, courts 
should continue to apply a substantial similarity analysis, including 
analyzing potential de minimis defenses.185
 
 Addressing one of the unresolved issues raised above, while judicial 
economy is still a problem, as pointed out by copyright scholars, this is not 
an issue that can be easily solved and generally requires a case-by-case 
determination.186 Bridgeport’s rationale behind its bright line test for judicial 
economy disregards the fact that most copyright infringement actions are 
subject to a substantial similarity test and courts have so far managed to 
handle the load.187 Regardless, when faced with such a situation, as 
                                                 
183
 See discussion supra Part II. C. 
184
 See discussion supra Part II. C 1–4. 
185
 See discussion supra Part I; Part II. C. 
186
 See NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A]. 
187
 See, e.g. Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192–95 (9th Cir. 2004) (using the 
substantial similarity test to determine the defendant’s use of a six-second, three-note flute 
segment of plaintiff’s musical composition was de minimis and did not satisfy the 
minimum constitutional standards for copyright protection and therefore not actionable as a 
matter of law); Leigh v. Warner Bros., 212 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding 
defendant’s film sequence not substantially similar to plaintiff’s work as a matter of law); 
Sid & Marty Krofft TV Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(using “total concept and feel” variant of substantial similarity test to find defendants had 
infringed on plaintiff’s copyright); Steward v. West, No. 13-02449, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
186012, *25–27 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2014) (applying substantial similarity test); Batiste v. 
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inconvenient as it may be, judicial efficiency should not trump legislative 
intent.188 
B.   An “Audience Test” To Determine A Minimum Threshold For 
Substantial Similarity  
 
 The modified “audience test” proposed in this section seeks to deal 
with those unresolved issues of judicial economy. In terms of what type of 
substantial similarity test courts should apply, critics, scholars and courts 
have proposed several variations, though many courts, including the Ninth 
Circuit, use the so-called “audience test.”189 Some copyright scholars 
criticize the test as not being faithful to the core tenants of the Copyright 
Act because it allegedly disregards all but the outward expression of the 
material.190 However, while the audience test is not perfect, it has been used 
                                                                                                                            
Najm, 28 F. Supp. 3d 595, 625 n.52 (E.D. La. 2014) (using substantial similarity test); 
Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1338–41 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (applying 
substantial similarity test); EMI Records Ltd. v. Premise Media Corp. L.P., 2008 N.Y. 
Misc. LEXIS 7485 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 8, 2008) (using substantial similarity test); see also 
NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A]. Granted, the Bridgeport court was faced 
with nearly 500 separate infringement claims, but in the end, those were whittled down to 
less than fifteen through pre-trial proceedings. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 
410 F.3d 792, 795 (6th Cir. 2005). 
188
 See discussion supra Part II. C. 
189
 See NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [E][1]. (“For over a century, the 
courts in general have purported to apply what is called the ordinary observer or audience 
test.”).  
190
 See id. at § 13.03 [A]. Nimmer argues “that the ‘spontaneous and immediate’ 
reactions of the ordinary observer are relevant evidence in determining the existence of 
copying. There is, however, reason to dispute the doctrine insofar as it makes the visceral 
reactions of the trier the ultimate test of copying (assuming access).” Nimmer goes on to 
point out that “[t]he Copyright Act is intended to protect writers from the theft of the fruits 
of their labor, not to protect against the general public’s ‘spontaneous and immediate’ 
impression that the fruits have been stolen.” The holding of the Supreme Court in Feist 
appears to offer evidence to the contrary, however:  
The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, 
but “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” To this end, 
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effectively by courts, and it could be adapted further in the context of music 
sampling cases to help courts determine when a minimal level of substantial 
similarity has been established. 
 The purpose of the modified audience test proposed in this section is 
to address the judicial efficiency issue the Bridgeport court sought to 
resolve with its bright line rule, while still allowing courts to comport with 
the tenants of copyright law and the legislative intent behind the Copyright 
Act. The test is designed specifically for pre-trial use in sampling cases and 
courts may choose to use a more in-depth substantial similarity test for the 
actual trial. But because pre-trial motions for summary judgment and their 
equivalents play such a large role in the gatekeeping function of courts,191 
and given the potential for large-scale sampling litigation as seen in 
Bridgeport,192 a separate, efficient test for summary judgment would aid in 
                                                                                                                            
copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but 
encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information 
conveyed by a work. This principle, known as the idea/expression or 
fact/expression dichotomy, applies to all works of authorship. 
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted). Thus on a basic level, the audience test, at least in the context of music 
sampling, appears to comport with the general principles behind the Copyright Act as 
determined by the Supreme Court in Feist. It should also be noted that Bridgeport dealt 
with an undisputed sampling of plaintiff’s work. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 796. If the 
sampling is disputed, however, the issue of whether the sampling artist has actually 
sampled the work would require additional evidence to prove there was a copying of the 
original work. 
191
 D. Theodore Rave, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 81 N.Y.U. 
L. REV., 875, 877–78 (2006) (“The adoption of Rule 56 expanded the availability of the 
motion to both parties in all types of actions, but its purpose remained the same. The 
architects of the rule saw summary judgment as a way to reduce ‘law's delay’ and help 
clear crowded court dockets.”).  
192
 See supra note 56. 
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sorting cases which are viable from those which are not, while adhering to 
the goals of copyright law. 
 The modified audience test proposed in this section would be used 
pre-trial to determine whether an allegedly sampled portion of a song is 
legally significant enough to sustain a cause of action for copyright 
infringement. The proposed test seeks to create an analysis which is not as 
technically daunting as a test like fragmented literal similarity,193 but one 
that remains true to the goals of copyright protection as enumerated in 
arguably the most helpful analysis the Supreme Court has given to date on 
the boundaries of copyright protection, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Telephone Service Co.194 
 In Feist, the Supreme Court considered whether defendant’s copying 
of telephone numbers and other facts from a competitor’s phone book 
constituted copyright infringement.195 The Court explicitly rejected the 
“sweat of the brow” argument many lower courts had been using for 
decades to find infringement.196 The Supreme Court explained that the 
Copyright Act “assures authors the right to their original expression, but 
encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed 
                                                 
193
 See generally NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][1]–[2]. 
194
 Cromer, supra note 10, at 283 (“Absent a directive from Congress, courts have 
forged their own tests for copyright infringement, but again, without much guidance from 
obvious sources. The clearest directive enunciated by the Supreme Court was when in Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone & Telegraph Co.”).  
195
 Feist, 499 U.S. at 342–44. 
196
 Id. at 352–57. 
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by a work,” which the Court called the “idea/expression dichotomy.”197 The 
Court noted that bare facts cannot be considered original expression, and 
thus the reuse of an unoriginal expression will not be entitled to copyright 
protection.198 The Court held that in order for a work to be protected by the 
Copyright Act, originality is a key element and the work must contain a 
“modicum of creativity” to transform something like bare facts into original 
expression.199 
 Therefore, working off the premises from Feist, in the context of 
music sampling it follows that the sampled portion in question must contain 
a “modicum of creativity” in order to be an original expression that is 
protected from copyright infringement.200 Thus, the 0.23 second “horn hit” 
at issue in VMG Salsoul, being in essence a four-note, single-chord horn 
                                                 
197
 Id. at 349–50. Indeed, underlying the core of copyright law are two competing 
interests which must be balanced: protecting the copyright holder from plagiarism of his or 
her work, and allowing sufficient room for new artists to build upon prior works towards 
the goal of advancing the progress of science and art. Howard B. Abrams, Originality and 
Creativity in Copyright Law, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 4–5 (1992); see also Pote, supra 
note 17 at 642. The District Court in Bridgeport also recognized this balancing act, writing 
in their opinion: 
The Court recognizes that the fact of blatant copying is not 
challenged by the defendant for the purposes of this motion, and that the 
purposes of the copyright laws is to deter wholesale plagiarism of prior 
works. However, a balance must be struck between protecting an artist's 
interests, and depriving other artists of the building blocks of future 
works. Since the advent of Western music, musicians have freely 
borrowed themes and ideas from other musicians.  
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 842 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2002). 
198
 Feist, 499 U.S. at 350–51. 
199
 Id. at 362–63. 
200
 Id. 
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part, likely does not meet this minimum creativity requirement.201 If it did, 
virtually every individual horn note played could be entitled to copyright 
protection, which would be an absurd result. Thus, the key question 
becomes: how do courts determine when a sampled piece of music meets 
the “modicum of creativity” requirement? The test proposed below seeks to 
address this question. 
 The basic premise of the proposed test is: assuming there is evidence 
of sampling, does the allegedly copied music sample constitute a copying of 
constituent elements of the sampled work that are original, such that an 
average listener would be able to recognize it as being a part of the original 
work? 
 In applying the test, the crucial question becomes: is the sample 
taken a sequence of music that an average listener would be able to 
recognize as a pattern from the original song? If so, then the copied work 
has met the threshold of being “original,” and is subject to copyright 
protection because there is a minimal amount of substantial similarity, at 
least enough to stave off a finding of being de minimis. If it is not, then the 
portion copied does not meet the minimum standards for copyright 
                                                 
201
 Jennifer R. R. Mueller, All Mixed Up: Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films and 
de minimis Digital Sampling, 81 IND. L. J., 435, 440–41 (2006) (“courts recognize that 
there are a ‘limited number of notes and chords available to composers,’ and therefore 
‘common themes frequently reappear in various compositions, especially in popular 
music.’ Such common themes do not meet the minimum threshold for originality, in the 
same way that a very simple sentence in English would not. Notes, like words, must be put 
together in an original way that requires a modicum of creativity.”). 
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protection and thus the sampling is de minimis and the action should be 
dismissed.202 
 Though this may seem a bit tautological, the proposed test seeks to 
more clearly define the audience test and create a more discernable line in a 
very subjective area of the law. Ultimately, the substantial similarity 
analysis essentially comes down to an exercise in line drawing,203 and this 
proposed test seeks to simply help determine where the baseline should be 
drawn by using an already-established form of the substantial similarity 
test.204 
 Take, for example, music created by a guitar: if an artist plays one 
note, is that an original expression that should be protected by copyright 
law? Almost certainly not. What about one chord? Again, probably not. But 
when an artist strings together a series of notes or chords, there is a point 
when the combination of notes and their arrangement becomes unique. Part 
of what defines that sequence of music as being unique is the ability of a 
listener to recognize the sequence or pattern of its tune. If a listener hears 
                                                 
202
 Courts could accomplish this in more than one way, however, the most obvious 
choice would be to do a “side-by-side” comparison of the songs at issue. The court could 
listen to the allegedly infringing sample, then to the original work and decide whether the 
sample has replicated a portion of the original work which an average listener would be 
able to recognize. By doing this kind of direct comparison, the court need not be familiar 
with the original work to determine if the sample replicates a recognizable portion of it, 
they merely need to be able to recognize the copied portion in the new work. 
203
 NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A]. 
204
 See NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [E][1]. (“For over a century, the 
courts in general have purported to apply what is called the ordinary observer or audience 
test.”). 
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only a chord or two, they may recognize it as the sounds of a guitar, but 
they likely would not recognize it as a part of a particular song. However, 
when enough notes or chords are played in a particular sequence, or in such 
a way as to make the sound unique, they become recognizable as something 
more than just guitar sounds, they become a unique tune which the listener 
can identify and which the listener would be able to recognize from the 
original work. It is at this point that copyright protection should be applied. 
 Consider analogizing the situation to Feist: the individual guitar 
notes or chords are like the facts (phone numbers) and their arrangement in 
a sequence is a compilation of those facts (the arrangement of the 
phonebook). This proposed test suggests that once the listener is able to 
identify the series of notes or chords as a unique compilation recognizable 
to the original work, it then satisfies the “modicum of creativity” 
requirement as set forth in Feist.205 As with the various audience tests 
currently employed by courts, this modified test could be used across the 
                                                 
205
 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362–63 363 (1991). 
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spectrum of music and musical instruments, including vocals,206 and 
“looped” samples.207 
 Thus, this proposed audience test, tailored for pre-trial 
determinations of whether allegedly sampled portions of songs are legally 
significant enough to bring a cause of action for copyright infringement, 
would comport with the guidelines of Feist and allow for the protection of 
the original author’s unique expression as identified by an average listener. 
This adheres to the core principle enumerated in Feist, that the author’s 
expression, and not the fruit of the author’s labor—for example simply 
playing a wholly unoriginal note or chord—should be protected.208 
                                                 
206
 As another example, a woman singing the two words “I love” might not be 
original enough to satisfy this test, but if a person were to sample Joan Jett’s vocal of those 
two words from the famous song “I Love Rock N’ Roll,” the average listener would likely 
identify the sample as being from Jett’s song, and thus substantial similarity would be 
established. In this scenario it is the singer’s unique expression (Jett’s voice and her 
tone)—not the words themselves—which the listener recognizes, and which is afforded 
copyright protection, consistent with Feist. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349–50.  
207
 Many of the cases involving digital music sampling deal with short pieces of 
sampled music which are then “looped” or repeated over and over in the new song; in two 
of the more widely cited sampling cases, Bridgeport and Newton v. Diamond, the samples 
at issue were both looped and modified. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 
F.3d 792, 796 (6th Cir. 2005); Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004). 
In theory, “looping” a small sample would probably not meet the de minimis threshold of 
the test proposed in this note, unless the looped sample is recognizable to the average 
listener. While this may seem to some like a “loophole,” the core of the test is whether the 
appropriation is recognizable to the average listener, which comports with the copyright 
principles set forth in Feist by the Supreme Court. See discussion supra Part III, 2. For an 
in-depth discussion of looping and de minimis (pre-Bridgeport), see Stephen R. Wilson, 
Music Sampling Lawsuits: Does Looping Music Samples Defeat the De Minimis Defense?, 
1 J. OF HIGH TECH. L. 179 (2002); see also Tonya M. Evans, Sampling, Looping, and 
Mashing … Oh My!: How Hip Hop Music is Scratching More Than the Surface of 
Copyright Law, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 843 (2011).  
208
 Feist, 499 U.S. at 362–63.  
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C.   Fair Use 
 
 Finally, courts should be open to analyzing defendants’ claims of 
fair use in sampling cases. It is unfortunate that neither Bridgeport nor VMG 
Salsoul addressed fair use,209
 
because it could be another viable defense for 
artists who sample. In general, analysis of the fair use doctrine as applied to 
music sampling is lacking,210 thus, judicial decisions directly on that point 
would be extremely useful. Recent cases like Lennon v. Premise Media 
Corp.211 and Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd.212 have held 
that if the copied portion of a work is sufficiently “transformative” in nature 
and does not appropriate a substantial portion of the original work, then the 
taking is not copyright infringement under the fair use exception even when 
the new use is commercial in nature.213 Additionally, the Second Circuit 
                                                 
209
 See discussion supra Part II, 3. 
210
 See generally Landau, supra note 45; see also Suppappola, supra note 9 at 100–
01. There are few cases which deal with “fair use” and music sampling. Landau, supra note 
45. Perhaps the closest case is Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., where the music group 
2 Live Crew parodied the lyrics of Roy Orbison’s ballad “Pretty Woman” and were sued 
for copyright infringement by the copyright owner; the action went all the way to the 
Supreme Court. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 571–72 (1994). The 
Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s ruling that because the use of the lyrics was for 
commercial gain it did not constitute fair use. Id. at 572. The Court held that while a 
parody's commercial character tends to weigh against a finding of fair use, it is only one of 
the four statutory elements which should be weighed in a fair use analysis. See id. at 594. 
The Court noted that the four factors laid out in the Copyright Act of 1976 are to be 
explored and weighed together in light of copyright's purpose of promoting science and the 
arts. Id. at 574–78. 
211
 Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 310, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
212
  Bill Graham Archives, LLC v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 386 F. Supp. 2d 324, 333 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
213
 See e.g. Lennon, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding the use of 
plaintiff’s music in defendant’s work transformative because it was being used to criticize 
the plaintiff’s song, even though the new work was partially commercial in nature); Bill 
Graham Archives, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding the defendant’s use of 
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Court of Appeals has held that “[t]he ultimate test of fair use . . . is whether 
the copyright law’s goal of promoting the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts would be better served by allowing the use than by preventing it.”214 
Moreover, in a 2013 decision, the Second Circuit held that there is no 
requirement that the new work comment on the original work or its author, 
only that the new use of the original work be sufficiently transformative, 
opening the door for a broader interpretation and application of fair use as 
an affirmative defense.215 
 In many sampling cases, the portion of the work used is edited and 
sometimes “looped,” and then inserted into another song to create a new 
musical composition.216 It is hard to predict how courts might rule, 
                                                                                                                            
Grateful Dead posters in his coffee table book to be fair use despite the commercial nature 
of his venture because they were sufficiently transformative and were part of a biography 
work on the band). 
214
 Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
215
 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The law imposes no 
requirement that a work comment on the original or its author in order to be considered 
transformative, and a secondary work may constitute a fair use even if it serves some 
purpose other than those (criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and 
research) identified in the preamble to the statute. Instead, as the Supreme Court as well as 
decisions from our court have emphasized, to qualify as a fair use, a new work generally 
must alter the original with ‘new expression, meaning, or message.’”). 
216
 See discussion supra note 207. For a more in-depth discussion on whether music 
created by or with samples from other songs is in essence its own form of creativity and 
expression which should be protected, see Evans, supra note 207 at 846 (arguing that 
sampling and looping are the creative processes which “are the hallmark of the type of 
creativity and innovation born out of the hip hop music tradition,” but that current 
copyright law “fails to acknowledge the historical role, informal norms and value of 
borrowing, cumulative creation and citation in music”); see also Pote supra note 17 at 642 
(arguing that copyright law “must balance the interests of current artists and the interests of 
future artists, and that mashup remixers seem to qualify as future artists under the 
Copyright Act”). But see Emily Harper Music Mashups: Testing the Limits of Copyright 
Law as Remix Culture Takes Society by Storm, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405, 406 (2010) 
2017] SPLIT CHORDS: ADDRESSING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 191 
particularly because there has been little guidance from Congress or the 
courts,217 but a valid argument could be made that the repurposing of a 
sampled piece of music in a new song is “sufficiently transformative” to fall 
under the fair use exception, even if the use is commercial in nature.218 
Thus, fair use might be a valuable affirmative defense for sampling 
musicians, especially if the sampling artist edited or modified the sampled 
work. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The issues addressed in this Note are complex, and music-sampling 
cases will continue to pose a challenge for courts in the future. An analysis 
of the two opinions shows there are several key flaws in the Bridgeport case 
and that the historical approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in VMG Salsoul 
is the preferable method. It is challenging to create a meaningful, objective 
standard or bright line rule for how courts should deal with substantial 
                                                                                                                            
(arguing that “mashups constitute copyright infringement, and that mashup artists are not 
entitled to the affirmative defense of fair use”).  
217
 See supra note 181. 
218
 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 45 at 138 (arguing that the fair use doctrine “should 
remain a viable defense to claims that sampling constitutes copyright infringement”); 
Landau, supra note 45 at 17–18 (arguing that the fair use doctrine should be used in music 
sampling cases and that the Compulsory License in Section 115 of the Copyright Act 
should be expanded to include music sampling under the fair use exception); but see 
Harper supra note 216 at 406 (arguing that “mashups constitute copyright infringement, 
and that mashup artists are not entitled to the affirmative defense of fair use”). 
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similarity. The modified audience test proposed in this Note seeks to offer 
courts an efficient way of scrutinizing actionable cases from de minimis 
cases via a straight-forward test which allows a case-by-case analysis of 
substantial similarity following the guidelines of Feist. 
 
